The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Summer, 1991 Vol. 16, No. 2

German-American Relations in the Post-Cold War World
David S. Germroth and Rebecca J. Hudson

The Problem of Transition from a Socialist to a Free Market Economy: The Case of Poland
Grzegorz W. Kolodko and Michal Rutkowski

State Control, Economic Planning and Competition Among Interest Groups for Government Transfers in Africa
John Mukum Mbaku

Race Differences: An Overview
Michael Levin

Science, Racism, and Sexism
Hans J. Eysenck

Council for Social and Economic Studies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copyright 1991 by The Council for Social & Economic Studies

The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies is published quarterly by the Council for Social and Economic Studies. All correspondence should be addressed to The Editor, 6861 Elm Street, Suite 4H, McLean, Virginia 22101, U.S.A. [Telephone (703) 442-8010: Fax (703) 847-9524]. Formerly known as *The Journal of Social and Political Affairs*, the subscription rate is $70.00 per annum for libraries and institutions, although scholars and private individuals are entitled to a privilege rate of $32.50 per annum. Reduced three years subscriptions are available at a cost of $180.00 for libraries and $90.00 for individuals. The attention of readers is also drawn to the valuable Monograph Series, (ISSN 0895-724X) published in association with the Journal and advertised elsewhere in this issue. Members of the academic community and other qualified individuals are invited to consult the General Editor at the above address concerning articles which may wish to submit for possible publication.

ISSN 0193-5941

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Roger Pearson
General Editor

Summer, 1991 Vol. 16, No. 2

CONTENTS

German-American Relations in the Post-Cold War World
By David S. Germroth and Rebecca J. Hudson 131

The Problem of Transition from a Socialist to a Free Market Economy: The Case of Poland
By Grzegorz W. Kolodko and Michal Rutkowski 159

State Control, Economic Planning and Competition Among Interest Groups for Government Transfers in Africa
By John Mukum Mbaku 181

Race Differences: An Overview
By Michael Levin 195

Science, Racism, and Sexism
By Hans J. Eysenck 217

Book Reviews
Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe 251
The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944 253

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL BOARD

General Editor
Roger Pearson

Council for Social and Economic Studies
McLean, Virginia

Advisory Committee

James T. Bennett
George Mason University

Stephen R. Bowers
James Madison University

Gary Bullert
University of Seattle

F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan
University of Natal

Sam S. Crutchfield, Jr.
Washington, D.C.

Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
Washington, D.C.

Daniel Ellegiers
University of Brussels

Julien Freund
University of Strasbourg

Robert E. Gilbert
Northeastern University, Boston

John H. Hallowell
Duke University

Garrett Hardin
University of California, Santa Barbara

George A. Kourvetaris
Northern Illinois University

Russell Kirk
Mecosta, Michigan

James Mayall
London School of Economics

Maxwell A. Miller
Mountain States Legal Foundation

Dwight D. Murphey
Wichita State University

Robert C. Richardson, III
Washington, D.C.

R.J. Rummel
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Alan Ned Sabrosky
Rhodes College, Memphis

Helmut Schelsky
Westfälische University

Robert Schuettinger
Yale University

Udo Weiss
Heidelberg University

Oleg Zinam
University of Cincinnati

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD

David S. Germroth and Rebecca J. Hudson
Temple University

The retraction of the Cold War, which brought about the unification of East and West Germany and the decline of the Cold War in Europe, inaugurated the rise of a 'new German question' as to what the newly re-united Germany's role will be in future international affairs. Events surrounding the 1990-91 Iraqi crisis placed the 'new German question' on the front burners of foreign policy debate in Germany, as well as in the capitals of Western Europe and Washington.

Now that Germany is united, and has the economic power to play an active role in world events, the question arises whether the political will among the people and political leadership is strong enough to enable Germany to accept the responsibility of a world power. Furthermore, is the world ready to accept a more active German role in world events and crises, particularly in military crises?

Most of the restrictions which govern Germany's military non-participation outside of Europe are the result of agreements made between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western allies prior to Germany's rearmament and entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1956. In February of 1957, the Bundestag voted for German inclusion in the NATO alliance with substantial funding to establish a military force to help counter the threat from the Warsaw pact nations. Under a series of agreements made between Germany and France, Britain, and the United States, the allies ended their postwar occupational control of their respective zones and gave the green light for Germany to establish a force of half a million men for the purpose of defending its territory.

The movement toward German rearmament came after several years of intense international debate. More important was the German domestic debate concerning rearmament and the desire to limit the use of German troops for purely defen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sive purposes. The internal debate became polarized into two camps.

The adherents to German rearmament held that the establishment of a German army would facilitate the maintenance of peace in Europe and democracy in the Federal Republic. Those opposing German rearmament feared that the establishment of a German army would lead to autocratic German militarism. The compromise was to establish strict constitutional restraints against the use of the *Bundeswehr*. After the establishment of the German army and the adoption of the various restrictive amendments within the constitution pertaining to the use of the German army, no further debate on the subject took place until the outbreak of the Iraqi crisis in August of 1990 (see Table 1).

The reasons the issue of rearmament became stagnant in domestic German politics are twofold. Firstly, as long as the Cold War dominated European politics and Germany and Europe remained divided into opposing camps, the goal behind West German military doctrine was the defense of the Federal Republic and Western Europe in a coordinated effort with the United States and other NATO members. Thus, an armed Federal Republic was an accepted necessity in the international as well as the German domestic political arena. As a result, the German military establishment was accepted not as a threat but rather as an enhancement to world peace. At the same time, the domestic view perceived the *Bundeswehr* as a guarantor of democracy in the Federal Republic and not as the threat to international peace that many rearmament opponents had claimed it would be.

Secondly, a good deal of the credit for the disappearance of negative sentiment toward German rearmament has to be given to the German political leadership of that period, and the methods in which the political leadership effected rearmament policy. Under extreme pressure by the Eisenhower administration for rapid rearmament, the Bonn government established policies that ensured total civilian control over the nation's military.

The Social Democrats, who were the most outspoken

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opponents of German rearmament, quickly joined the effort to create a defensive force of "civilians in uniform" that would be answerable to the elected civil leadership and trained to support a democratic constitutional order. As a result, all branches of the German armed forces were put under civilian control with civilian secretaries as the highest authority within the military hierarchy. The civilian secretary was then accountable to the Minister of Defence and not to the German General Staff. The Military Court of Justice was also placed under civilian control, responsible to the Ministry of Justice and not to the military establishment.

These policies helped facilitate the acceptance of the German armed forces, because they established enough checks and balances to pacify any possible fears of a neo-German military élite becoming politicized and attempting to use its military power to accomplish a political agenda.

In the view of the United States, German rearmament enhanced American strategy in terms of Soviet containment in Europe, and allowed more flexibility in the stationing of American troops. To American policy makers, German rearmament was the only way to balance the gap in manpower between NATO and the Warsaw pact.[1] Persistent pressure from America hastened the rearmament of Germany so that the United States could divert some of its military resources away from Europe toward other parts of the world.

The Basic Law: Restriction or Crutch?

One of the present obstacles preventing the German government from actively participating in military operations – such as the 1990-91 UN sponsored military coalition against Iraq – is the professed constitutional restriction against sending German troops outside of Europe or NATO territory.

As part of the 1956 agreement establishing a *Bundeswehr*, Germany had to assure the Western Allies[2] that its newly

1. Barnet, Richard J., *The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Post War World*, New York, 1983.
2. The western allies for this purpose were France, Britain and the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formed army would only be used to protect German territory or to defend the nations of NATO in the case of an attack by the Warsaw Pact. This assurance was enshrined in the German constitution as a way to ensure Germany's commitment to the West, and as a means to pacify those who were fearful of a revival of militarism in Germany.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting war led to domestic debate in Germany about whether this constitutional restriction should be dropped or amended in such a way as to allow German troops to participate in future military coalitions such as that assembled against Iraq. Such an amendment would require a two-thirds majority in both the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* – necessitating the support of the opposition Social Democrats who openly oppose such a amendment.

Even though support among the German general public for the American-led UN action in the Gulf was parallel to that in the United States (70%), the overwhelming majority of Germans opposed a German military involvement in such actions. This was true especially of those Germans who experienced the ravages of war during the Second World War in Germany.

The constitutional restriction being referred to is Article 87 of the German Basic Law (Constitution). The focus of Article 87 is the buildup, strength, and use of the German armed forces. In this article the following is found:

Article 87a

1) The federation shall build up armed forces for defense purposes. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget.
2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this basic law.
3) While a state of defense or of tension exists, the armed forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and discharge functions of traffic control in so far as this is necessary for the performance of their defence mission. Moreover, the armed forces may, when a state of defence or of tension exists, be entrusted with the protection of civilian property in support of police measures; in this event the armed forces shall co-operate with the competent authorities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4) In order to avert any imminent danger to the existence or to the free democratic basic order of the federation or a land, the federal government may, should conditions as envisaged in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and federal border guard be inadequate, use the armed forces to support the police and federal border guard in the protection of civilian property and in combating organized and militarily armed insurgents. Any such use of the armed forces must be discontinued whenever the Bundestag and Bundesrat so requests.

Many legal scholars, academics, and politicians in Germany are not in agreement with the claim that the Basic Law restricts German military participation outside of NATO or Europe. They assert that this is a false interpretation of the Constitution brought on by pacifistic teachings of the Post Second World War era. This view is rooted in the idea that Germany was the cause of two major wars in the twentieth century and that Germany should not be allowed to become a military heavyweight or resort to military force as a means of obtaining political ends. Secondly, this interpretation reflects an aversion to the forty year fixation on the Cold War. During this time Germans focused on the only military engagement they felt possible – a war between East and West which would be fought on German soil. Thus, the restrictive interpretation has become the political reality among the German people.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the CDU desire to change this political reality to make it possible for Germany to aid its Western allies when future threats arise outside Europe. They feel that the Constitution must be amended in order to clarify the disputed articles and to forge a new political consensus in terms of Germany's role in world events.

By contrasts, Karsten Voigt – SPD expert on military affairs, who reflects the opinion of most of the SPD – argues that Germany does not need a constitutional change to forge a political consensus, because a political consensus on the question of expeditionary deployment of German troops has been reached. This consensus is overwhelmingly in favor of the present interpretation of the Basic Law in regard to military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deployment.

Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the symbolic end of the Cold War, it would have been futile to discuss German participation – even in a United Nations peacekeeping force. Now that the East-West confrontation seems to be subsiding, the 'new German question' debate is becoming central to many foreign policy forums. In the long run, it will be necessary for Germany to move toward greater participation in international engagements both UN and non-UN in nature. However, the German national conscience first needs time to accept this new responsibility before the public will tolerate an expanded German military role in world affairs. The German as well as the French and British publics still fear German participation in future wars. The German public suffered heavily as a result of their defeat in World War II, and also, as German President Richard von Weizsacker said during an interview with *Die Zeit* in February 1991, "...The world does not want to rediscover what good soldiers the Germans can be."

A third very prominent and outspoken group on this issue in Germany maintains that the possible revival of German militarism is an outdated argument being used to prevent a wider German participation in world events. The circle's main spokesperson has been the Editor in Chief of the *Rheinischer Merkur* newspaper, Thomas Kielinger. He and his fellow-thinkers believe that if Germany continues to assert that it is not to be trusted, then this will only breed distrust.

Kielinger and his associates maintain that the issue of German participation in military operations outside of NATO should be seen in Bonn as a litmus test and as a method of reinforcing German credibility in the world. Germany (West) has proved itself over the last forty years to be a reliable partner and ally. By its reluctance during the Gulf Crisis and its manipulation of the constitutional interpretation which prohib-its active participation in the UN military action, Germany undid a good portion of the esteem it worked to develop since the end of the Second World War. With the April 1991 deployment of German troops to the Middle East to build a Kurdish refugee camp, Germany has sent troops outside of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO. Although many on the Left of German politics argue that the deployment to the Middle East was based on humanitarian and not military concerns, this action still contradicted Bonn's previous justification for not participating in the Gulf crisis because of constitutional restrictions. The Kurdish refugee effort in Iraq acted as a springboard for the reinterpretation of the German constitution.

The Iraq Crisis and German-American Relations

The Gulf Crisis came at a time when Germany found itself concentrating all its efforts toward German unification. It is quite understandable that the Gulf crisis, which was the major political news item in every form of American media in December of 1990, took the back burner to the German elections and questions of unification in Germany; and ironically, on January 17, 1991, the day the US coalition went to war with Iraq, Helmut Kohl was sworn in as the first all-German chancellor since World War II.

Regardless of the real or perceived constitutional restrictions against German deployment of troops outside NATO or the preoccupation of German leadership with unification, German-American relations suffered seriously from the Gulf Crisis. This may cause lasting damage to the special relationship which has developed since 1949. Not only did the misunderstanding between the United States and Germany as to the latter's political resolve in the Gulf War result in a rift in United States-German ties, but it also sparked a resurrection of Leftist anti-Americanism in the form of anti-war demonstrations in Germany, reminiscent of the early 1980s. These demonstrations, in view of the Gulf situation, were perceived in the United States by both the public and policy makers as morally inequitable.

As a result of German policy or lack of policy toward the Gulf, many American political analysts, the public, and members of Congress (see Table 1) espoused the notion that Germany has turned into an amoral nation that only worships economic prosperity. Germany was perceived as a nation content with being an economic world power but unwilling to take responsibility in the international arena. This view was reinforced when

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

debate developed in Germany as to whether in the event of an Iraqi attack on Turkey (see Table 2) Bonn would stand by its prescribed NATO commitment and assist in the defense of Turkey.

Many American policy makers were surprised at this debate. Since 1949, German security against a Soviet attack was guaranteed by all members of NATO, and as a result of NATO's resolve in the defense of Germany unification became possible.

A major reason for the misunderstanding between American and German policy makers on Germany's position during the Gulf Crisis stemmed from Bonn's failure to enlighten the American public about the debate surrounding the constitutional restrictions placed on Germany when it was asked to rearm in 1956. This failure was reinforced by Bonn's lack of appreciation of America's seriousness in carrying out the various United Nations resolutions. And finally, Bonn thought that its willingness to support the Gulf effort financially would satisfy its international responsibility in the eyes of the West, while allowing it to appease domestic resistance toward military activism.

What further complicated US-German ties was publicity focussing on the fact that German companies were responsible for Saddam Hussein's vast chemical and enhanced SCUD missile capabilities. This not only angered those who felt animosity toward Germany, but also brought about tensions between Bonn and America's closest ally in the Middle East, Israel.

In hindsight, as one views the situation surrounding German-American relations during the Gulf Crisis, it is necessary to place some of the blame on the insensitivity of American policy makers and the American public toward the post-Second World War German dilemma and the resulting pacifistic attitudes found in modern German society.

Germany has long been viewed in the United States and the world as a warlike nation. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States and its allies made a concerted effort to cultivate a society in Germany which would resist a Prussian war

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentality. So it cannot be expected that after a forty five year effort to rid the German society of its traditional militarism, Washington and the West would now expect the Germans to revert to their old national behavior and willfully send German troops to the world hotspot at a time when Germany was in the process of healing the last and biggest wound of the Second World War.

It is true that Bonn miscalculated the Gulf situation and in effect damaged German-American relations, which were – only a year prior to the 1990 Gulf Crisis – the strongest they had been since the end of the Second World War. However, Washington failed to take German interests into consideration and that Germans may need several years to examine their new post-unification image and to debate what role Germany should play in world events.

German foreign policy in the later part of the Cold War was based on *Ostpolitik*, and the notion espoused by German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher that Germany was the bridge between East and West and that through East-West cooperation a unified Europe and Germany could result. Now that the policies of Genscherism have borne fruit, Germany must be provided with time to enable it to formulate a new doctrine for its foreign policy. Germany's new foreign policy will have to determine how Germany may decide to participate in future UN actions such as the 1990-91 Iraqi Crisis, and whether it will shoulder some of America's responsibilities in the world. And finally, Germany's new foreign policy will have to coordinate with the European Community's (EC) policy.

Washington is not fully exempt from responsibility for the post-Gulf War deterioration of German-American relations. Washington and the Western allies did not consider the peculiar situation in which Germany found itself at the outset of the Gulf Crisis and, as a result, were unwilling to allow time for the formulation of a new German foreign policy. The United States also failed to inform Bonn fully of its overall intentions in the Gulf. Since Germany was not a member of the United Nations Security Council, Germany had to rely on second and third-hand information to assess the Gulf War

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situation. Bonn was not consulted as a partner in the Gulf War, although it was used as a springboard for United States troops and equipment bound for the Middle East.

German Public Sentiment: Anti-War or Anti-American?

The heart of the anti-war demonstrations in Germany centered on Leftist activists within the trade unions, churches, peace groups, and alternative political parties like the Greens or Alternative Liste. A good portion of the cadre participating in the demonstrations were veterans of the 1989 East German revolution.[3] These demonstrators, although rejecting the notion of being anti-American, placed the blame for the outbreak of hostilities, through speeches and actions, primarily on the shoulders of America. Much of the anti-war leadership espoused the opinion that America was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities; others felt that the people of Kuwait had no problem with becoming a part of Iraq and that America used the incident as an excuse for war (see Tables 2 and 3).

The anti-war movement met with resistance from pro-American groups. Although scattered and not as vocal, these groups infiltrated the anti-war rallies with banners and signs reading, "We are not Anti-American" and "Solidarity With Israel". Although the anti-war protestors were perhaps the most vocal movement in Germany during the Gulf Crisis, it was no reflection of overall German public opinion toward the United States or the Gulf effort. A majority of the German public favored the United Nations coalition's action against Iraq, but the anti-war protests largely played upon the post-Second World War passion for non-violence and pacifism among the German nation.

It is interesting to note that although a good portion of the German public is pacifist, most Germans are anti-pacifist. They view the pacifistic philosophy of 'weapons are never the answer' and 'pacifism no matter what the calling' as irresponsible. A poll conducted by the Wickert organization in late January 1991

3. *Die Zeit*, January 26, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

showed that eighty percent of the Germans surveyed supported military action in the Gulf and that eighty-five percent had no sympathy for the anti-war demonstrators in Germany. However, the same survey revealed that seventy five percent of those surveyed still believed that Germany should not become militarily involved.

The rise of conscientious objectors in Germany further substantiates the successful transformation of the post-war German national consciousness away from its traditional militarism toward pacifism. In Germany, twelve percent of the young men eligible for military service opt for conscientious objector status rather then serve in the armed services. The system of civil service in Germany requires that all men of the age of 18 serve in the military for twelve months. Those who are religiously or morally against the use of force or weapons can apply for conscientious objector status which, if accepted, requires the individual to serve fifteen months as a civil servant. Civil servants have been used to fill a needed role in various social institutions like old age homes, hospitals, handicap institutions, etc.

At the start of the Gulf conflict, the number of applications for civil service rose from its already high level. In fact, Germany had the highest number of conscientious objector applications in all of Europe. The prevailing attitude supporting German non-military participation in the Gulf conflict was reinforced by the number of conscientious objector applications received between January and February of 1991 (see Table 4).[4] In January and February of 1991 applications increased three to four times compared to the same period in 1990. Half of the applications were from reservists who feared a possible NATO, and thus German, involvement in the Gulf War. The second major portion of the applications, which kindled a debate about the ability of Germany effectively to meet a military crisis in the future, came from active duty personnel attempting to change their status to conscientious objector! Many military experts

4. Information source: Bundesamt für Zivildeinst. Bonn Germany.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have argued that the German army, although quite capable in terms of equipment, would be unable to confront a future conflict or sustain a military operation because of the prevailing conviction in the German national conscience toward pacifism and the anti-militarism provisions under which it operates.[5]

The right of Germans to declare conscientious objection grew out of the history of the German nation and the experience of the two major world wars. This prevailing attitude is also a result of the de-militarization of the German national conscience.

Helmut Kohl's Gulf War Dilemma: Allied Commitment versus Domestic Opinion

The Federal Republic of Germany sent no troops to the Gulf region, but debate over the war during the latter part of 1990 and the onset of 1991 raged as if thousands of German lives were at risk in the conflict. While the elected lawmakers in France, the United Kingdom and the United States passed legislation to support the war effort, Bonn heatedly discussed the possibility of Germany being forced to participate if Iraq were to attack Turkey with some *Bundestag* members questioning the fright of Kohl's government, about whether Germany would be required to live up to its NATO responsibility if Iraq were to attack Turkey. This circle argued that if there were an Iraqi attack on Turkey, it would have been provoked by American sorties flown from Turkey, thus disqualifying Turkey from NATO protection[6].

Although the debate over the Gulf War in Germany reflected a pacifistic sentiment which resulted from Germany's past military experience, such debate within and outside the government in Germany placed Helmut Kohl in a very difficult position. On the one side he had to take into consideration German public opinion, while on the other side he sought to show some form of credible support for the allied war effort against Iraq.

---

5. *Der Spiegel,* February 11, 1991.
6. *Frankfurter Rundschau,* January 16, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such a situation forced Kohl and his government to develop a policy of assertiveness when placing the blame for the war on Saddam Hussein while publicly being vague on all other matters pertaining to the Gulf situation. An example of such vagueness can be found in Kohl's response to the debate over Turkey in which he refused to state whether an Iraqi invasion would force Germany to get involved in the War. The entire debate placed Helmut Kohl's government in an awkward position in terms of foreign policy and allied relations.

On the other hand Kohl sent a squadron of fighter jets and support personnel to Turkey as a sign of Bonn's willingness to stand by its commitment under article five of the NATO collective security agreement. At the same time, Kohl quelled his domestic opposition with the assertion that any use of German military to defend Turkey would have to be discussed and voted on in the *Bundestag* prior to the use of force.[7] As a means of diverting allied claims that Germany had not been fulfilling its international obligations in the Gulf War, Kohl announced a policy of increasing German financial support to help defer the cost of the Allied efforts.

The pre-election rhetoric by the CDU-CSU about initiating talks on a constitutional amendment which would allow deployment of German troops had all but disappeared from the Kohl domestic agenda, but was very much a part of Kohl's foreign policy agenda when dealing with allied complaints. To further complicate Kohl's predicament, American and British intelligence informed Kohl that at least one hundred German enterprises were still maintaining economic contacts with Iraqi companies despite the United Nations trade embargo.

The dilemma that faced Helmut Kohl placed his government in an awkward position both at home and abroad. The Gulf Crisis raised fundamental questions in the United States: Could Germany be relied on in future crises? And what role would Germany play in the Post-Cold War, Post-Gulf War world? Thus, the Gulf conflict created a new identity crisis for

7. *Stutgarter Nachrichten*, January 31, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany.

The Gulf War has changed the way many Germans view themselves and the role of their nation in the future world order. Germans are beginning to agree that their country must begin to make active contributions to worldwide security policy (see Table 7). The old 'German question' is resolved with the waning of East-West tensions. The new international atmosphere, 'the post-Cold War order,' saw its first challenge in the Gulf War. This was also the first major conflict Germany had to face outside the Cold War bi-polar security structure. This was a first for German foreign policy makers who now find themselves acquiring a new role and are re-orientating themselves away from the habitual Cold War approach in foreign policy toward a new post-Cold War world.[8]

The unification of Germany not only promise to make Germany economically more powerful, but has also raised speculation that Germany will become the leading power factor in Europe and the world. Germans seem not to be prepared for this new political situation and for their new role as a unified nation. The very absence of direction in domestic political rhetoric reflects Germany's belief that Germans will immerse themselves in a European context and belief that the EEC will be the answer to the 'new German question.'

Germans have to confront the fact that the Cold War, in which a bipolar system dictated the direction and scope of foreign policy for the two German nations, is over. There is no longer a special German role which insulates Germany from the burdens of international politics.

German domestic politics have not been spared the effects of the Gulf War. As Mr. Volker Ruhe, General Secretary of the CDU, stated during an interview with *Die Zeit* in April 1991, the main long-range task for German domestic politics is to ensure that the *Bundeswehr* will be able to play a role in facing future crises. Espousing a popular view among many conservative and Free Democratic German politicians, Mr. Ruhe stated that

8. Please see the interview with the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Chairman Hans Stercken, *Rheinische Post*, March 5, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany must be willing to take on additional responsibility in the security policy field. The reputation of Germany and its future relations with NATO and other Western allies in the 1990s would depend on Germany's willingness to play a more active role in sharing the burden of international security.

The German place in the post-war international order cannot be settled by merely giving the *Bundeswehr* the blue helmets of the UN peacekeeping forces, as suggested by the Greens and SPD. Such an attempt would only act as a temporary solution to the problem. For Mr. Ruhe, willingness to take on additional responsibility in the security policy field means being like the British or the French, and the new Germany should differ from its partners as little as possible in this respect.

The official policy of German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (FDP) is one of 'wait and see,' which places Mr. Genscher at the center of the debate on Germany's future foreign policy agenda. The attitude that Mr. Genscher espouses is based somewhat on the idea that a crisis similar to the Iraq War – where the UN Security Council through a unanimous vote of all five members initiated a collective security action – will not re-occur at any time in the near future. Unlike Chancellor Kohl, Genscher avoids committing himself on the questions of a constitutional extension of the *Bundeswehr's* right to operate in areas on the periphery of NATO.

Critiques of Genscher's handling of the Gulf War crisis and the post-war debate have accused him of being reluctant to support the anti-Iraqi coalition and as being a major source of the ambiguity in German policy during the Gulf crisis and in the post-Gulf War period. A particularly vocal opponent of Genscher's policy during the Gulf War was CSU General Secretary Erwin Huber, who in April 1991 called for a clear correction of Germany's foreign policy. Mr. Huber has proclaimed that Genscher's "speechlessness during the Gulf Crisis caused serious damage to Germany's international image." Although opposition to Genscher's method of handling Germany's foreign policy after the Gulf War has even surfaced within his own Free Democratic Party, the CDU is still com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pelled to accept Genscher's foreign policy methods out of political pragmatism. Without Genscher, the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition would dissolve, forcing a national election in which the CDU, in view of its weak performance in the recent state elections in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Hamburg, could be defeated.

Dependent on FDP support as the CDU is Mr. Genscher is the longest-sitting foreign minister in Europe. He has been acting in that capacity since 1974. Throughout his tenure as foreign minister, Genscher has irritated officials in Washington and in the capitals of other allied nations by appearing not fully to support allied initiatives. This image of Genscher, an image of quasi-neutralism, has become known as the trademark of Genscherism.

In a speech delivered in Switzerland in April of 1991, Mr. Genscher rebuffed complaints that he acted against the interests of the anti-Iraqi coalition, and claimed that he has always given the coalition his clear and unequivocal support. Genscher went on to state that Germany carried more than its fair share of the burden for the establishment of a peacefully evolving world. Mr. Genscher also suggested that if foreign powers expect Germany to assume greater responsibility in the world, then Germany should be given the chance to express its views more strongly in the United Nations Security Council a proposal that may well meet with French objections.[9]

As for the post-war reaction by the Bush administration to German policy, there was little movement toward construction of a concrete agenda or the establishment of a U.S.-German agenda for future crisis situations. The frictions which developed between Germany and its Western allies during the crisis have taken a back seat to other issues in Washington, but are still very much a part of discussion between Germany and America. Such animosities were reflected in Genscher's speech to the 1991 World Economic forum:

---

9. Genscher at Eye of Policy Debate, *The New York Times,* March 22, 1991. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are China, The United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Germany's critics today are often the same critics who warned about a new German superiority, in the military field too, just six months ago. Germany does not demand preferential treatment, fairness is enough.

Although the speech was not directed at America, Secretary of State James Baker was quick to respond to Genscher's speech by writing a letter to him praising Germany for its contribution to the Gulf, as well as addressing other matters mentioned in the World Economic Forum. In addition, the German foreign minister received a warm welcome from both Congress and the White House during his March 1991 visit to Washington. Clearly this was meant to counter the malicious press commentaries and Capitol Hill comments during the Gulf Crisis.

There was good reason for the American administration's friendliness toward Genscher and his advisors. America needs Germany in the post-war era. This need is not simply a product of German power, but is based on America's need for German support if it is to build any 'new world order.' Germany will have to play a pivotal role in any 'new world order'.

NATO and the European Pillar

The United States expects that Germany will play a vital role in European unification by forging links with the states of eastern and central Europe while retaining cohesion in the Atlantic alliance and guaranteeing the stability of NATO. President Bush, in a 1989 speech in Mainz, acknowledged America's interest in Germany as "a partner with a leading role". During the CDU foreign policy conference in May 1991, American Ambassador Vernon Walters reaffirmed President Bush's vision of a German-American partnership. Ambassador Walters also made clear American fears that the development of a separate Western European security policy and the creation of a "European pillar" would undermine both the long-established unity of NATO and the United States' future political role in Europe.[10]

---

10. *Handelsblatt Dusseldorf*, 17 May 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American policy makers are calling upon the German government to reconsider this development and to work in coordination with the United States to ensure that nothing is done to weaken NATO. For the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is the central component of American involvement in Europe. In view of the French effort to turn the Western European Union (WEU) into a security and defence system for the European Community, American policy makers perceive that the United States' influence in future European affairs is in danger of being supplanted.

France would like the nine member states of the WEU to establish a common policy-formulating mechanism within its framework and then create a single representative for the WEU in NATO.[11] The WEU would also have its own armed forces, which would be stationed alongside, but independent of, NATO forces. America is expecting Germany to use its influence to ensure NATO's position as the preeminent defence and security structure. In spite of American expectations, German policy makers seem to be divided on the ability of NATO to reshape its role away from the Cold War structure into an alliance for future security needs. While there is still wide support for NATO, many Germans, both within and outside the government, agree with the views of the German Defence Minister Stoltenberg.

During the CDU foreign policy conference, Defence Minister Stoltenberg, in an attempt to address America's fears, stated that, "in the future, transatlantic ties would be at least as important as in the past." However, Stoltenberg declared that the establishment of a stronger structure within the WEU framework would strengthen NATO for several reasons. Firstly, the existing security structure is unsatisfactory because France, although a member of NATO, does not participate in the military structure of the alliance. Secondly, a stronger WEU was needed because not all of the European community members are part of WEU or NATO. However, Stoltenberg stressed that

11. Members of the WEU are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his vision of the WEU was one of cooperation with NATO that would guarantee closer transatlantic ties.[12]

Because of the movement toward the establishment of the WEU, Washington views Germany as its future doorway into European politics in the post-Cold War world. Bush administration policy makers are concerned over many issues in respect to European integration and hope that Germany will safeguard these interests. Many issues and questions were presented to Mr. Genscher and his advisors during their March 1991 visit to Washington.

Some of the issues concerned the effect that a single European Community and market would have on future German-American and European-American relations; the prospect of a common security policy for Europe (which is primarily being discussed between Bonn and Paris) developing into a rival institution to NATO; the political vacuum emerging in Eastern Europe with the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Could the Germans, with their growing economic and political influence, maintain some form of order until the area stabilizes? Was the Balkan region becoming a powder keg once again; and if so could not the Germans, for the same reasons mentioned above, prevent the area from exploding?[13]

Conclusion

In summarizing the present situation with regard to post-Cold War German foreign policy and its effect on German-American relations, one must consider various psychological and philosophical elements that are deeply rooted in contemporary German society.

The psychological aspect grew out of the history of the German nation which has been held responsible for causing two major World Wars in this century. As a result of the German sense of national guilt that has been created wars and the active effort by the victorious allies of the Second War to cultivate a society in Germany which would resist a war mentality, Germa-

12. *Frankfuter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 May 1991.
13. *Department of State Bulletins*, March 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ny has achieved the de-militarization of its national conscience.

This demilitarization of the German national conscience will have a profound effect on the foreign policy Germany chooses to pursue. In cases where conflict could require active military participation, there will be strong resistance within German society and the political leadership to a military solution. The world cannot expect that after a forty-five year effort to rid German society of its warlike tendencies that the Germans will revert to their old pre-war national behavior and willfully march into a non-NATO battle.

The philosophical impact upon German foreign policy is much more intricate and can be classed under two headings: economic concerns and security. The economic philosophy of Germany is the more important. Throughout the post-war period, Germany emphasized its economic ability as a way to participate in the international arena. As the German national conscience began to reject Prussian militarism, the void was filled by an economic philosophy, whereby Germany became an economic powerhouse in the heart of Europe and the West. Through strong fiscal policy and ardent fear of recession, West Germany was able to establish itself as a respected member of the world community.

As economic concerns replaced military aspects in the German national conscience, the very philosophy of security among the German nation was redefined. Security, as it affects the establishment of foreign policy, is no longer strictly defined in military terms, but rather in terms of economics. Economic stability both for Germany and in the context of the European Community is an essential goal of German foreign policy. And finally, there is the linkage between the notion of security for Germany and Europe and the addressing of environmental problems. These concerns will affect not only German foreign policy toward the other European states, but also German-American relations in the future.

Military security is the last and least important factor. The need for Germany as a nation to defend its borders against a European attack is now regarded as unlikely. With the movement toward European political cooperation and a common

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European defense policy, German foreign policy as a single nation-state actor will be influenced least by this aspect. In terms of United States-German relations, military security could cause some strain if the European nations in NATO, who are also members of the Community, opt for a European defense\security establishment (West European Union or Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) outside of the NATO structure.

Precisely at the time America's role as the world's leading military power was being confirmed (the Iraqi Crisis), the reality of American economic decline was becoming apparent. America is realizing that it is in danger of "Imperial Overstretch" and of overtaxing its capabilities.[14] Consequently, America sees Germany as the power in Europe most capable of supporting those duties pertaining to world security that America is struggling to perform.

Both Secretary of the State Baker and President Bush have urged Germany to accept its share of international responsibility. The absence of the *Bundeswehr* from operation Desert Storm has not diminished Bonn's political significance in Washington and the West. This fact has been confirmed by the Bush administration's friendly and cooperative attitude toward Kohl, Genscher and other German leaders during the post-Gulf War months of March through May of 1991. However, it is safe to assume that in the event of another call for collective security action by unanimous vote of the UN security council, strong diplomatic pressures would be imposed on Germany to participate militarily in whatever action was determined.

14. Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall Of Great Powers.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Appendix I

German Contributions to the Gulf War Effort

Although Germany was unable to contribute military forces to the 1990-91 anti-Iraqi coalition effort in the Gulf, it attempted to balance its constitutional restrictions with material and financial contributions. Germany contributed almost 11.4 billion dollars (see Table 8) in the form of military hardware, services, and cash payments to member allied countries, and to Israel.[15] Germany also gave financial assistance to the various friendly Arab states as a means of deferring economic hardship caused by the Iraqi Crisis. The most significant contribution to the Americans was $5.5 billion to help finance United States troop operations in Desert Storm.

In addition to financial contributions, Germany sought to deploy military forces within the NATO theater to free American and British forces for Gulf deployment. To relieve NATO forces in the Mediterranean, Germany deployed an additional destroyer and supply ships to the *NATO On Call Force Mediterranean.* In addition, Germany deployed a counter-mine force to the eastern Mediterranean, as well as a contingent of maritime patrol aircraft to the central Mediterranean. Germany sent a fighter bomber squadron of Alpha jets along with 1,000 support personnel and troops to support Turkey against possible Iraqi attack. In respect of the post-War Kurdish refugee problem, Bonn has sent supplies and manpower to build a camp for 5,000 refugees in Iraq. Its help of the Kurdish refugees served to improve Germany's profile after the criticism aimed at it for not participating militarily in the Gulf War. Bonn's refugee effort in Iran consisted of twenty helicopters and two hundred troops. Bonn spent a total of $250 million dollars for aid to the Kurdish refugees and for the construction of refugee camps.

---

15. The term services refers to direct financial contributions to the US for fuel and transportation costs, the use of German transports to shuttle military equipment south toward the Gulf, and supplies of various ordinances to the US and other Allied forces and to assist Israel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Appendix II

TABLE 1

The German Constitution does not allow for the *Bundeswehr* to participate in the coalition effort in the Gulf, because the Gulf is outside of the NATO territories. Should the Constitution be changed to allow the *Bundeswehr* to participate in future action such as the joint allied initiative in the Gulf, are you against changing the constitution to allow for such action?[16]

JAN 1991	TOTAL	CDU-CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS	OTHER
FOR CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION	21.5%	24.4%	18.0%	25.8%	14.9%	19.8%
AGAINST CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION	73.8	68.0	79.3	72.8	85.1	76.4
DO NOT KNOW	4.7	7.6	2.7	1.4	---	3.8
FEB 1991	TOTAL	CDU-CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS	OTHER
FOR CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION	28.2%	31.3%	24.3%	29.9%	11.5%	33.5%
AGAINST CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION	67.8	61.1	74.1	70.1	85.5	62.9
DO NOT KNOW	4.0	7.6	1.6	---	3.0	3.6

[16] Information source: *Politbarometer* Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim Germany under contract from the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen. Survey was conducded during Januaray and February of 1991 in the whole of Germany (both east and west).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

I am going to name a few countries. For each of the countries, please state if you have gained respect or lost respect for it as a result of the Gulf War, or if your opinion has not changed.[17]

	GAINED RESPECT	LOST RESPECT	NO CHANGE
1) Britain	71	2	27
2) Israel	69	4	28
3) Saudi Arabia	60	11	28
4) The USSR	24	26	29
5) Germany	25	22	51
6) Japan	19	30	50
7) Iran	16	31	51
8) The UN	70	4	26

[17] information was adopted from a Washington Post ABC Poll conducted between March 1-4 1991. Poll was based on 1.215 randomly selected adults margin of error, plus or minus three percentage points

TABLE 3

If the Gulf War were to expand into Turkey should German soldiers, that are presently stationed in Turkey, be used to defend Turkey.[18]

JAN 1991	TOTAL	CDU-CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS	OTHER
SHOULD BE USED	48.3%	54.0%	46.9%	48.0%	22.9%	44.0%
SHOULD NOT BE USED	47.1	40.4	50.6	46.9	75.0	48.8
DO NOT	4.6	5.6	2.5	5.1	2.1	7.2

FEB. 1991	TOTAL	CDU-CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS	OTHER
SHOULD BE USED	51.4%	59.3%	44.5%	60.6%	29.7%	51.1%
SHOULD NOT BE USED	44.4	35.5	51.3	37.6	66.2	45.4
DO NOT KNOW	4.2	5.2	4.2	1.8	4.1	3.5

[18] Information source: *Politbarometer* Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim Germany under contract from the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen. Survey was conducded during Januarary and February of 1991 in the whole of Germany (both east and west).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

Are you in agreement with the American led military action against Iraq?[19]

	FEB 1991	MARCH 1991
IN AGREEMENT	60.2%	70.0%
AGAINST	36.3%	27.1%
DO NOT KNOW	3.5%	2.9%

TABLE 5

Who is in your opinion, carries the main responsibility for the outbreak of the Gulf War?[20]

FEB-MARCH 1991	TOTAL	CDU-CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS	OTHER
IRAQ-HUSSEIN	82.7%	88.7%	78.9%	88.6%	69.7%	79.3%
USA-BUSH	4.9	1.3	7.9	2.7	8.4	6.1
THE WEST	0.8	1.6	0.7	-	1.4	-
OTHER	5.8	4.8	6.7	5.3	9.2	5.1
DO NOT KNOW	5.8	3.6	5.8	3.4	11.3	9.5

[19] Information source: *Politbarometer* Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim Germany under contract from the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen. Survey was conducded during Januarary and February of 1991 in the whole of Germany (both east and west).

[20] Information source: *Politbarometer* Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim Germany under contract from the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen. Survey was conducded during Januarary and February of 1991 in the whole of Germany (both east and west).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 6

Applications for conscientious objector status comparison from January and February 1990 with 1991.

MONTH	# OF APPLICATIONS
JANUARY 1990	8,864
FEBRUARY 1990	7,492
JANUARY 1991	22,197
FEBRUARY 1991	31,135

TABLE 7

Now that Germany is united, the people and governments of other nations expect Germany to take over more responsibility in international affairs, particularly in relation to conflict resolution. Do you agree or disagree that Germany should take on more responsibility in world affairs?[21]

	TOTAL	CDU-CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS	OTHER
AGREE	54.8%	58.9%	59.1%	66.2%	48.6 %	41.1%
DISAGREE	42.6	39.5	38.9	33.7	45.5	54.3
DON'T KNOW	2.6	1.6	2.0	0.1	5.9	4.6

[21]Information source: *Politbarometer* Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim Germany under contract from the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen. Survey was conducded during March of 1991 in the whole of Germany (both east and west).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 8

I. Contributions to the military burden-sharing	
1. Participation in bearing the cost of U.S. military expenditures.	6.623
2. Participation for bearing the cost of military expenditures for other countries	977
3. Participation in bearing the cost of defense expenditures for Turkey	1,029
4. Participation in bearing the cost of defense expenditures of Israel	826
5. Contributions within NATO	205
II. Contributions to the economic stabilization of Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and other countries.	
1. Bilateral Contributions	1,505
2. German Share of EC Contributions	221
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS	11,386
DATA ACQUIRED FROM THE GERMAN INFO. AGENCY, NY	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEPENDENT FROM BUREAUCRACY



REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA

Politics, Bureaucracy and the Public Interest

Edited by ROGER MEINERS and BRUCE YANDLE

Foreword by ROBERT W. CRANDALL

*I*n 1980, there was popular belief that the size of government would be cut. However, the growth of the federal budget has continued and no agencies have been phased out. Covering areas ranging from antitrust and telecommunications to international trade and public lands, this powerful book analyzes attempts at reform, the incentives in Washington, and policies that failed and succeeded.

"The best book on Reagan's overall regulatory relief effort, **Regulation and the Reagan Era** *describes what happens when the rubber of the academic scribblers hits the road of agency recalcitrance to regulatory reform."*
—JAMES C. MILLER, III, Former Director
Office of Management and Budget

*"***Regulation and the Reagan Era** *is not only very sound analysis and good political advice, but it is readable."*
—GORDON TULLOCK, Professor of Economics
and Political Science, University of Arizona

6 Figures • 6 Tables • Index • 304 pages • Paperback • Item #6065
$19.95 plus postage ($2.00/book, CA residents add sales tax)



ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY

Anatomy of a Policy Failure

DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO

Foreword by YALE BROZEN

A thoroughly documented indictment of antitrust policy in the U. S., ***Antitrust and Monopoly*** draws on all the classic antitrust cases in business history to illustrate that the laws have not been employed against monopolies, but have been used instead to restrain the competitive process.

"The single best book on this vital public policy issue, and it should become a, if not the standard work in economics, history, and political science."
—PUBLIC CHOICE

"Skillfully honed, eloquent, Armentano's book must be mastered by all who would be heard on this issue."
—BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW

"This book should be on the required reading list of every course in antitrust in law schools, business schools, and departments of economics."
—DONALD DEWEY
Professor of Economics, Columbia University

6 Figures • 4 Tables • Index • 306 pages • Paperback • Item #4003
$19.95 plus postage ($2.00/book, CA residents add sales tax)

The INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE

ORDER TOLL FREE 1-800-927-8733
Credit card orders only. 24 hours a day.

The Independent Institute, Dept. AT8, 134 Ninety-Eighth Avenue, Oakland, CA 94603

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITION FROM A SOCIALIST TO A FREE MARKET ECONOMY: THE CASE OF POLAND

Grzegorz W. Kolodko
Warsaw School of Economics and Research Inst. of Finance
Michal Rutkowski
The World Bank and Warsaw School of Economics[1]

This paper deals with problems arising from the economic transformation to a market economy in post-Communist Poland during which macro-stabilization policy is of great importance. The authors examine the response of the real sphere of the economy toward the shock stabilization program and market oriented institutional changes. Poland's recent economic turn-around has been spectacular, but vestiges of the old-order still exist, parallelling the problems faced in other post-Communist countries in East and Central Europe. However, in the Polish case, there is very deep recession following stabilization efforts, which has been accompanied by rising unemployment.

This paper gives new insight into the time lag between these two phenomena and provides comprehensive explanations of the various forces – both economic and political – behind macro-stabilization, micro-adjustment, and institutional changes on the road to a market economy.

The transition from a socialist centralized system which has been taking place in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 is an event of historical significance, but one which is full of changes. The political and economic move toward European political and economic unity also creates problems as well as offers potential economic benefits.

The current transition from authoritarian socialism in Poland is particularly interesting because Poland decided to undergo a shock therapy, often called a "cold turkey" approach to transi-

1. The article was written while Grzegorz W. Kolodko was a Senior Visiting Scholar in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. All views and interpretations in the article are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to the International Monetary Fund, to their affiliated organizations, nor to any individual acting on their behalf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, as distinct from the gradual approach chosen in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This paper analyzes the first results of Poland's stabilization plan as implemented in January 1990, backed as it is by various international institutions. We focus on the contrast between expectations and reality in output, wages, prices and employment, and try to explain the reason for these huge differences. Section 2 deals with the results of the program to date, while section 3 compares stabilization with a broader context of systemic transformation to a market economy. It is against this background that, in section 4, an attempt is made to explain the causes of the huge divergences between the assumed targets and the achieved results. Section 5 addresses the puzzle of the Polish labor market, namely the difference between the drop in output and the drop in employment. Finally, section 6 compares the relative merits of a "cold-turkey" treatment and provides concluding remarks and perspectives.

Results of the Program

The results of Poland's stabilization program have surprised observers. If the program's goals as formally stated were adopted as evaluation criteria, we would be obliged to conclude that it had failed. The program had anticipated a 5 percent drop in industrial production in comparison with 1989, which was to be accompanied by an increase in the unemployment rate of about 2 percent of the total work force (400,000 people). In fact, industrial production dropped by 25 percent and unemployment reached 6.3 percent in December 1990 (1.1 million people) and by mid-1991 about 8 percent and 1.5 million respectively. Program estimates had also assumed that some unemployment would be due to the reallocation of resources across sectors, while in reality, despite a ferocious demand squeeze, bankruptcies and restructuring did not occur on any significant scale; most of the unemployment created during 1990 was, in fact, related to an aggregate shock. This happened with an inflation rate of 580 percent combined with an increase in nominal wages of 430 percent, both much higher than the government's expectations. Incomes policy, based on tax penalties for excessive increases in wages, was to be a main

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1

Stabilization Program in Poland in 1990: Assumptions and Results

Rates of Growth (in percent)	Assumptions	Results
Industrial Production	-5	-25
Unemployment Rate	2	6.3
Inflation (consumer price index, "point to point")	60	580
Gross National Product	-3	-18
Real Earnings	-20	-30
Trade balance (billions of dollars)	-0.8	+2.2

Source: Central Statistical Office and National Bank of Poland.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tool for forcing down real wages. However, incomes policy was never binding, as in the first months of 1990 wages were well below the estimated maximum, while in the second half of the year they were much above the norm, although the indexation scheme was based on monthly norms. Finally, when viewed in comparison with the actual slump in industrial production, rather than with expectations, layoffs were modest and employment in the state sector dropped only 10 percent. Information on anticipated and actual results of the stabilization program are provided in Table 1.

Moreover, not only were the announced goals not achieved, but what was achieved was obtained at a much higher cost than that originally foreseen in exchange for better results. In particular, the scale of decline in the standard of living and in real wages has been much larger than originally announced by the government, since real wages fell by as much as 30 percent,[2] while government anticipated a fall of between 15 to 20 percent at most. The real money balances of the households was reduced on a still larger scale.

It's therefore no wonder that in the presidential election of November 1990 the incumbent prime minister running for president got a poor 18 percent of the votes. The Polish people voiced their negative evaluation of the economic situation. It is just because his stabilization program failed that Mazowiecki's government was impelled to resign, and not the other way around. It is not true that the destabilizing effect of the election

2. This fact is still overlooked by one of the foreign experts who had foretold a decline in the inflation rate of 1 percent at most for the first month following the package initiation. Jeffrey Sachs (1990) declares: "There has been a persistent – and certainly erroneous – forecast of a 20 percent unemployment rate, though the unemployment rate stands at 5.5 percent, lower than in the United States. Similarly, fears of plummeting take-home pay abound, though the average industrial worker earned the equivalent of $131 in October, compared with $108 in October 1989." As we mentioned above, government forecasts of the unemployment rate spoke of 2% and not 20%. Besides, comparing the unemployment rule in Poland, which within one year has grown from zero to over 6 percent, with unemployment rates in the United States cannot be taken seriously. Finally, suggesting a more than 20 percent wage rise by converting wages into dollars, in a situation where in real terms wages really have fallen by almost 30 percent, is an utter misrepresentation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made the program implementation impossible; it was this program that determined the results of the election. This is an extremely important fact, as an accurate assessment of the Polish experience is essential from the point of view of other post-communist economies which will have to undergo similar anti-inflationary and stabilizing therapy.

Stabilization Versus Transition to a Market Economy

The stabilization program in Poland included five main facets: fiscal adjustment, price liberalization and adjustment, tough monetary policy, wage control, and exchange rate unification.

An assessment of stabilization program results should not be separated from the broader context of systemic transformation oriented towards creation of a market economy, otherwise it would be one-sided and over simplified. The stabilization package being implemented in Poland must be perceived in the broader perspective of the complex market-oriented transition process. A hypothesis can be framed that, in reality, stabilization has been subordinated to transition in so far as transition is the primary strategic goal, to be attained even at the cost of failure of the stabilization policy, inclusive of further destabilization.

Moreover, the transition process is to a certain extent forcing further destabilization, this being especially visible in those post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in which, before the acceleration of the market-oriented systematic transformation, inflationary processes were little developed (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Baltic republics of the USSR i.e., Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). This results from the simple fact that a market-oriented transition requires, among other things, policy measures such as price liberalization, subsidies reduction, devaluation, significant rises in interest rates, etc. Consequently, in the initial period, orientation towards a market economy brings about an acceleration of inflationary processes rather than the reverse.

In Poland's case, at the moment of stabilization program initiation, the market-oriented economic reforms were already considerably advanced; in 1989 the Polish economy was in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forefront of the Eastern European countries – then, not yet called post-communist (post-socialist) – which were progressing towards a market economy. In theory, a stabilization policy different from that actually chosen – and similar to the attempt undertaken in 1982 – could have been adopted. However, in 1987, it was inflation stabilization, with simultaneous reform of the socialist economy without any infringement of its fundamental principles, that was intended. It was a stabilization after which the State was to remain the dominating agent in almost all spheres, and the scope of economic liberalization, including price liberalization, was limited (Kolodko 1989).

Whereas the 1990 stabilization constituted not only a fight for internal and external equilibrium of the economy, but also creation of a different economic mechanism, it was supported by numerous policy instruments typical of the market economy.

Thus, when looking at the Polish stabilization program in this perspective, the negative assessment formulated in the preceding section requires relativization. It is true that the stabilization policy of the first post-communist government led to the deepest recession in postwar Poland and in contemporary Europe, attaining the highest level of inflation in Europe in 1990. But it is equally true that the Polish economy has already approached closer to a market economy than any other post-communist country. Subsidies have been markedly cut, the budget is balanced and any possible deficit may now, by law, not be monetized. Prices are to a very large extent liberalized, internal currency convertibility has been introduced, the privatization process has been set in motion, and elements of financial markets are being developed.

In these circumstances, one must ask whether certain positive effects achieved in respect of the transition to a market economy do not unavoidably have a cost, which finds its expression in a consistent decline in the standard of living. The costs have been high indeed, and any attempt to belittle the cost, not backed by any factual argumentation (Sachs 1990), does not change the facts; at most such arguments merely present them in a false light. However, detailed analyses show that the huge cost of the institutional transformation of the market and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accompanying stabilization policy has not been unavoidable. Its magnitude could have been much less if the numerous errors contained in the stabilization package had been avoided and the target had not been overshot.

Overshooting

One of the basic errors of the stabilization package was the expectation of a quick positive supply response on the part of the business sector. Enterprises behaved – and this inertia is still present – differently than they would have done in a market economy (Jorgensen – Gelb – Singh 1990). The response to supply was very low, and the enterprises generally responded to shock reduction in internal demand not by improving their efficiency but by maximizing prices – which, this time, in the case of a radical departure from the shortage economy, was limited by an effective demand barrier – as well as by a reduced absolute output level. One can see also a sort of time lag in the adjustment of employment to falling output, since the difference between these two rates cannot be fully explained by the factors we consider in the next section, and that are also discussed elsewhere (Rutkowski 1991).

Wrong assumptions with respect to reality were rooted in the naive belief that output would automatically rise without stimulation from appropriate macroeconomic policy. Some rate interventionist attempts were too late and badly sequenced. The post-communist economy is not yet a market economy (though not a planned economy any more). It is in a "systemic vacuum" period in which traditional fiscal and monetary policy instruments are functioning somewhat differently than in a developed market economy. The problem consists not only in using an appropriate set of policy instruments, but also in applying it at the right time. And this has not occurred, since we have had – on the one hand – a general overshooting of the program, and – on the other hand – wrong responses resulting from undue insistence on the automatic functioning of certain mechanisms. In other words, a kind of "over-liberalization" of the economy has taken place here in the context of its over-bureaucratization in the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The above-mentioned overshooting has resulted, in particular, in an excessive reduction in household incomes (among other things, in real wages) as well as the excessive limitation of the liquidity of enterprises due to faulty sequencing of the monetary policy. As far as the former is concerned, the adoption of the indexation coefficient permitting a wage growth by only 0.2 of the price rise has led to a drastic drop in household demand, and in consequence, a decline in sales and in production induced by lack of demand. Whereas the desired stabilization effect could have been achieved through a much smaller – 20 percent – reduction in real wages, the real reduction in the first two months of the stabilization amounted to more than twice that much.

What is more important, the mechanism for controlling the pace of the nominal wage rise was constructed in such a way that any utilized limit of the admissible wage rise can be utilized in the following months (upon exceeding this limit, the enterprise has to pay a prohibitive tax ranging from 200 to 500 percent, depending on the scale of overstepping the limit.) And this is what has happened, especially in the latter half of the year. This mechanism, together with a very short (monthly) indexation period, led to the inflationary pressure in the second half of the year. The whole incomes policy was thus recessionary (through reduction in effective demand, and consequently, in sales and production), at the beginning of 1990. Since then, its action has been inflationary, since an acceleration of wages has not led automatically to output growth but rather, in the first place, to an acceleration of inflationary processes. This has been particularly visible since September 1990. Thus, the statistical indices of real wage changes cannot be averaged, since the excessive drop at the beginning of the year is not neutralized by the excessive rise in its latter half. Because the former brought about recession which need not have been so severe, the latter has not been able to reverse the situation.

Further, the drastic rise in interest in January, and the subsequent restrictive and pro-recessionary levels till the end of February, almost provoked a collapse in the real sphere. It was mainly during these two months that the huge recession – in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the order of 30 percent – took place. Since then, the economy has remained in recession. Whereas the explosion of the so-called corrective inflation took place mainly in the former half of January, the high interest rates exerted a mainly pro-recessionary rather than anti-inflationary influence – since its real negative level with respect to deposits did not exceed the inflationary expectations of the household sector. The administrative regulation of interest rates in monthly cycles – which has little in common with real cycles of economic and financial processes – was not flexible enough. Appropriate modifications to the interest rate policy were made only in November. Interest on household deposits has risen – though they are still negative in real terms. This rise especially related to medium-term (three and six months) deposits – which under stabilization conditions are long term – but the move was made too late. By now the rate of inflation, of interest rates and of inflationary expectations are all growing. The increase in interest rates by the central bank and commercial banks only authenticates and strengthens the inflationary expectations of the public. In such a situation, raising interest to its real positive level can bring about a perverse effect in accelerating rather than checking inflation. If interest rates on deposits had been set at a high real level beginning with the 7th or 8th stabilization week, this might have overcome the strong inflationary expectations. This could still be done in the 3rd to 5th month of the package implementation, but by November-December it was a right move at the wrong moment, and thus an ineffective one.

The third basic aspect of overshooting has been the devaluation scale. The official exchange rate was reduced too much – even below the market (parallel) rate level. In this way it anticipated the so-called corrective inflation, and this was what really happened – although the inflation scale was much higher than expected because of the negative feed-back between the scale of devaluation and the devaluation accelerated inflation. The exchange rate has been maintained over the whole year (initially, a three-month period only was assumed), but, this sudden, deep exchange rate devaluation – with simultaneous additional charges imposed on imports – was an additional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

impulse stimulating both the corrective inflation and the recession. In the latter case the impulse arose from a reduction in imports, which in turn lead to a still deeper drop in production.

A particular kind of overshooting also took place not in the economic sphere but in the political one. The fundamental political breakthrough in Poland in 1989, which led to the takeover of power by "Solidarity," was accompanied by vast popular support for the new government. This fact – as well as a fundamental change in the West's attitude toward Poland – permitted the government to undertake the extremely difficult and socially painful economic program, inclusive of its stabilization aspects. However, its awareness of vast popular support – as confirmed by all public opinion polls – convinced some of the politicians that the limit of social resistance to radical change was very remote and that even a severe blow in the form of a shock stabilization program was feasible. While in previous periods stabilization measures did not go far enough, this time a clear abuse of social confidence took place and the restrictiveness of the fiscal, monetary and income policies was overshot far beyond the level of social acceptance. This was a fundamental political mistake. The damage done to the public's confidence in economic change has been an irreversible loss.

Surprise in the Labor Market?

The labor market trend is often viewed as particularly surprising, namely, the relatively modest drop of employment, as compared to the drop in output. Yet, are the facts really obvious? Prior to 1990, it was a shortage economy which was slipping into hyperinflation and was experiencing so-called "shortageflation" (Kolodko and McMahon 1987) due to excess aggregate demand ("overheating" typical of socialist economies) with a widespread lack of financial discipline including a budget deficit and a loose control of the money supply. Basically, open unemployment did not exist, although many vacancies were advertized. Instead of open unemployment, a substantial labor hoarding (concealed unemployment) existed, estimated at up to 25 percent of the labor force (Gora and Rutkowski 1990). There

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were signs of increasing mismatch: having included labor hoarding into the overall rate of unemployment, the Beveridge curve was shifting outward (Rutkowski 1990).

What might have been expected to happen in the labor market when the tough stabilization policy was implemented against such a background? Can we analyze an overall hypothetical fall in employment by 25 percent (1:1 with production) into its component parts, and then attribute each of these to different factors? Can we satisfactorily explain why employment did not fall by 25 percent?

First of all, there is no reason to expect that a fall in output would bring a commensurate fall in employment, since productivity, no matter how it is measured, is procyclical. Evidence for this assertion seems to be strong (see Rotemberg and Summers 1990). It is difficult to estimate precisely how procyclical it might have been in Poland during the recession in 1990, but evidence from other countries shows that, on average, output rises (or falls) by about 1.25 percent when man-hours employed rises (or falls) by 1 percent. Allowing for differences between the labor input measured by man-hours and the number of employees, let us assume that in the Polish case this coefficient was between 1.2 and 1.3. This means that during a 25 percent drop in output we might have expected a 19-21 percent drop in employment – or, in other words, that a 4-6 percent less drop in employment than in output should have occurred.[3]

Secondly, putting aside sectorial aspects, a demand shock is going to produce a drop in employment due to demand deficiency resulting from a fall in real wages. This is the macro-effect. But, at the same time, a fall in real wages can be expected to produce an increase in labor demand through the substitution of labor for capital – that is to say, in the short run more labor with the fixed capital stock. This is the micro-effect.

3. The coefficient for Poland could be even higher than 1.3 due to labor hoarding at the starting point. Rotemberg and Summers (1990) showed that firms that hoard more labor also have more procyclical productivity. The reason is that firms that hoard large quantities of labor have lower marginal costs than those that do not. Hence the wedge between price and marginal cost is larger, and productivity is more procyclical.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Both are well known and described extensively in the literature: the macro effect is a typical Keynes-Kalecki effect, while the micro effect is described in very basic macroeconomic textbooks. In the context of adjustment and stabilization in various countries, extensive comments on both effects have been provided recently (Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar 1991). The net outcome will thus depend on the relative strength of the macro- and micro- effects.

What happened in Poland in 1990? Real wages dropped heavily, increasing the share of profits and negatively affecting aggregate demand. At the same time, the drop in real wages encouraged firms to hire more labor. Could they alone have offset the macro-effect and explained, why employment dropped only by 10 percent, while output fell by 25 percent, with existing labor hoarding and – allowing for procyclical behavior of productivity as explained earlier – when there were reasons to anticipate a 19-21 percent drop in employment?

But this only partially explains the situation. What matters is certainly the elasticity of labor demand. In Poland, the fraction of total costs that constitute payments to labor are low – below 20 percent. Assuming an elasticity of 0.15-0.2, had real wages fallen by 30 percent, an increase in labor demand due to the micro-effect could not have been more than 4.5-6 percent. This cannot explain the reality fully. We are still left with a 5 percent fall in employment that "should" have occurred. Moreover, if we assume that labor hoarding should have decreased in 1990, due to a micro-adjustment in the firms, even more has to be explained. Could this be explained by a standard theory of adjustment if we include sectoral shifts?

The answer seems to be negative. The anticipated effect of adjustment to the labor market would be a reallocation of employment from non-tradables to tradables – a result of devaluation and tight monetary policy that would force firms to find new sales outlets. If we take into account that labor intensity in Poland is higher in the tradables sector than in the non-tradables sector, we may expect that wage-driven sectorial shifts toward the tradables sector would offset the standard macro-effect and explain why employment decreased by a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2

Sectoral Data on Employment, Production and Export 1990 (1989 = 100), real terms

Sector	Prod.	Employ.	Rank	Exp.	Rank
Fuels & Energy	80	96	2	129	6
Metallurgy	77	91	4	168	1
Elec. machinery	79	90	5	114	7
Chemical	80	94	3	155	3
Wood & Paper	76	89	6	167	2
Light	65	87	7	145	5
Food Processing	74	97	1	150	4
Rank correlation coefficient (export & employment)				- 0.2	

Source: Statistical Bulletins of the Central Statistical Office, Warsaw.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relatively small fraction. The problem is that the data do not seem to confirm the above hypothesis: the decline in employment in exporting sectors was not smaller than elsewhere (see Table 2).

Let us now look at some findings of the theory of a shortage economy and its explanatory power. The fundamental work in this field (Kornai 1980) offers some insights which may partly explain the gap we seek to fill.

The basic problem stands as follows: what is the effect on actual employment of a decrease in capacity utilization, if at the starting point this capacity utilization exceeds the "welfare optimum"? (defined in Kornai 1980, p. 281-282). There should be no doubt that before 1990 the Polish economy was overheated, that is, the attempted capacity utilization was above the "tolerance limit" defined as a point where the marginal social cost begins to exceed the marginal social benefit. "Overheating" has many dimensions. For the labor market, the following two are the most important:

(i) An attempt to maximize capacity utilization creates (in a socialist economy) a famous coexistence of shortage and slack. Striving to achieve the maximum capacity utilization can increase measurable output and productivity, but at the same time it leads to bottlenecks, a forced substitution of inputs, a forced intertemporal reallocation of labor, a decrease in quality and widespread shortages. The more frequent and intensive the shortage, including labor shortage, the greater will be the internal slack, including labor slack.

(ii) Capacity utilization above the "welfare optimum," due to bottlenecks, increases the demand for finance, particularly for working capital. This is, in particular, the case in countries where capital markets are far from being perfect; where the availability of cash or savings within the firms becomes critical. It decreases investment and in that way the actual utilization of labor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 3

Employment Effects of the Fall in Output by 25 percent in 1990 in Poland (Totals in Percent)

Actual fall in employment (Keynes-Kalecki macro effect)	10
Why employment did not fall more:	
- Procyclical behavior of productivity (coefficient 1.2 - 1.3 assumed)	4 - 6
- Increase in the demand for labor due to the fall in real wages (standard micro effect, elasticity 0.15 - 0.2 assumed)	4.5 - 6
- Decrease in labor slack due to the fall in capacity utilization (Kornai's shortage removal effect)	1 - 1.5
- Decrease in vacancies	2.5
TOTAL	22 - 26

Source: Own estimates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The demand shock which took place in Poland in 1990 sharply decreased the degree of capacity utilization. Exact data are not known but given the high degree of monopolization, when firms applied the "mark-up" pricing rule, as the mark-up increased, the degree of capital utilization fell. Our hypothesis is that a part of this fall produced an increase in actual employment and thus generated an effect working in the opposite direction to the standard macro-effect of falling demand. How great this effect was depends on the previous "overheating," that is, the capacity utilization above the "welfare optimum." Disappearance of a shortage implies that employees (who used to be subsequently overworked and idle in short intervals due to widespread bottlenecks and forced substitution in the pre-reformed economy) have actually been better utilized after the demand shock and so a decrease in the attempted capacity utilization has occurred. Their work has become more smooth and better organized. Labor slack and unemployment-on-the-job have decreased since shortage and "overheating" disappeared.

Certainly this perverse effect could have been working only in relation to a small portion of the decline in capacity utilization from the "welfare optimum". The size of this portion is extremely difficult to estimate since, due to measurement problems, we know very little about the slack created by shortage in the "overheated" economy. Assuming very roughly that n percent rate of shortage creates $n/4$ percent "rate of slack" (on the basis of some micro-observations about behavior of raw materials' stocks in state enterprises), we can determine estimates of the rate of shortages. Such an estimate for 1986 was calculated based on forced savings and brought a result of 6 percent (Kolodko and McMahon 1987). Casual observation indicates that in the second half of 1989 the labor shortage might have been slightly lower compared to 1986 (due to a partial replacing of the repressed inflation by an open one (Kolodko 1991)). This suggests results within the range 1-1.5 percent of the decrease in labor slack (a quarter of 4-6 percent).

Finally, in a shortage economy, vacancies had constituted an important part of labor demand. Hence we have to take into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

account a sharp drop in vacancies advertised from 250,000 in December 1990 to 50,000 a year later. It allows us to account for 2.5 percent of the fall in employment which "should" have occurred and this almost bridges the gap.

Table 3 presents the results of our rough estimates. They rest on arbitrary assumptions, but we believe they illustrate important phenomena which help us to understand labor market adjustment in a post-communist economy. The basic message is that the Polish adjustment is not so surprising if some less frequently discussed issues are taken into account.

Cold Turkey Versus Gradualism: Conclusion and Perspectives

What can be said about the pace of transition to a market economy? There are many arguments for the superiority of a cold-turkey-type approach over gradualism. Dornbusch and Fischer (1990) stress that a shock therapy is the only one which can gain the necessary credibility with respect to stabilization policy. After the initial shock – by its very nature, extremely painful for the population – there is the possibility of spectacular short-term effects in the fight against inflation. If so, the shock therapy can be effective – if it is not followed by a too-early loosening of financial restrictions. For example, in Yugoslavia, after a period of high inflation (64 percent) in December 1989, this was reduced to zero in the second quarter of the following year. This was a spectacular effect which authenticated the cold-turkey approach (Kolodko/Gotz-Kozierkiewicz/Skrzeszewska-Paczek 1991). But soon afterwards, a renewed acceleration of inflationary processes took place (up to 4.6 percent monthly in the last quarter of 1990) which diminished the credibility of the program.

In Poland, in effect the program failed to gain the necessary credibility because the inflation rate did not fall – even temporarily – to the level foretold by the government. After December 1989, when the inflation rate was reduced from 55 percent in October to somewhat less than 18 percent, it bounced up to 80 percent in January 1990 and then down to 23 percent in February. Eventually, a stabilization of inflation took place at a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

level several times higher than that announced by the government and – as a result of these announcements – than that expected by the population. The correct conclusions were not drawn from this fact, and implementation of false program assumptions continued in the illusory conviction that overcoming the inflation was – under the given institutional, structural and political conditions – only a function of time. So, the cold-turkey approach did not succeed. This however does not in itself testify to the superiority of the gradualism approach. It must be clearly stated that, in the face of the economic disequilibrium and inflation which existed in Poland in 1989, a policy of shock therapy was the only justifiable course. The fault lay in the wrong implementation of the methodologically right shock approach. The unique chance was wasted.

Another aspect of the cold-turkey versus gradualism dilemma is the necessity to distinguish the three plains on which economic processes take place, particularly those bearing on the transition from a socialist to a market economy. These plains are: stabilization, transformation, and restructuring of the real sphere. The shock approach is applicable to stabilization only. In cases of especially severe inflationary process it is frequently the most appropriate policy. Such was Poland's case. With respect to systematic transformation – that is to say, with institutional systemic changes – although there is a desire for possible rapid progress here too – the cold-turkey approach is not applicable. We note one exception, however, of which we take no account here, namely the absorption of the former German Democratic Republic into the powerful West German economy.

There is nothing like a Polish Big Bang in the systematic sphere. The transformation process in this area was subject to an evident acceleration in the framework of the general historic process of changes spreading over the whole post-communist world, and even was feeding back into these changes. Here we have not to do with a shock approach but with a gradualism natural for such cases, although the transformation itself is of revolutionary character. It is of key importance that the institutional change process perceived in the above way must be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attached to a proper sequencing of correcting measures. (Nuti 1991).

Shock policy is even further out of the question with respect to structural changes, since these by their very nature require a longer-term perspective. Against this background it must be concluded that the rather widespread talk about the Polish Big Bang is exaggerated, since it can at most refer to stabilization and not to the whole institutional and structural market-oriented transformation of the economy. The latter is a long-lasting, gradually evolving process with extremely complex implications.

When talking about perspectives, the problem of time horizons arises at once. Over a longer period – estimated at many years – there is no reason why relatively optimistic forecasts and scenarios should not be framed. But over a short period, progress in macroeconomic stabilization is hardly to be expected. The "shortageflation" syndrome is replaced by "slumpflation," involving a very high rate of both inflation and recession. The inflationary-versus-shortage trade-off has been replaced by an inflation-versus-recession trade-off.

Moreover, the adverse impact of the external situation must not be overlooked. In the first place, price inflation was exacerbated by the change in settlement principles between post-communist countries which began with 1991 as well as by the rise in the prices of energy, in particular oil. It is to be added that the latter had to a certain extent already been accommodated during the last months of 1990. However, uncertainty is still inherent in possible international conditions. Some could and should have been foreseen (a transition from settlements in rubles to settlements in U.S. dollars and the resulting pro-inflationary and pro-recessionary effects), while others (e.g. the oil shock caused by the Middle East conflict) complicated the situation in an unforeseeable way.

But there is also is a feedback between the political situation – on the one hand – and stabilization and transition processes on the other. One can hardly expect this situation to be as favorable in the future as it was in the initial period of stabilization program implementation. Therefore, successive attempts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at stabilization – whose necessity is beyond any doubt – may prove even more difficult.

The lesson of the Polish experience in the implementation of stabilization policy should be particularly useful to other post-communist countries. These will face – or are already facing – many dilemmas which Poland has tried to solve – for better or for worse. Now that the so-called Polish experiment has entailed such high social costs, it would be well if lessons learned from it were widely studied by other countries.

REFERENCES

Dornbusch, R., and S. Fischer
1990 *Macroeconomics*, fifth edition, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Gora, M. and M. Rutkowski
1990 The Demand for Labor and the Disguised Unemployment in Poland in the 1980s, *Communist Economies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 325-334.

Horton, S. Kanbur, R. and D. Mazumdar
1991 *Labor Markets in an Era of Adjustment: An Overview, the World Bank*, February, mimeo.

Jorgensen, E.A., Gelb, A., and I.J. Singh
1990 *The Behavior of Polish Firms after the "Big Bang": Findings from a field Trip*, the World Bank, November, mimeo.

Kolodko, G.W.
1989 *Reform, Stabilization Policies, and Economic Adjustment in Poland*, Wider Working Papers, WP 51, World Institute for Development Economics Research of the UN University, Helsinki.
1991 *Inflation Stabilization in Poland, A Year After*, "Rivista di Economica Politica", July.

Kolodko, G.W., and W.W. Mc Mahon
1987 *Stagflation and Shortageflation: A Comparative Approach*, "Kyklos", Vol. 40, No. 2 pp. 176-197.

Kolodko, G.W., Gotz-Kozierkiewicz, D., and E. Skrzeszewska-Paczek
1991 *Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Post-Socialist Economies*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Mass. (forthcoming).

Kornai, J.
1980 *Economics of Shortage*, North Holland, Amsterdam.

Nuti, D.M.
1991 Crisis, Reform and Stabilization in Central Eastern Europe: Prospects and Western Response, in Fitoussi, J.P. (ed.) *Eastern Europe: The Transition*, Paris.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rotemberg, J.J., and L.H. Summers
1990 *Inflexible Prices and Procyclical Productivity*, "The Quarterly Journal of Economics", Vol. CV, No. 4, pp. 851-874.
Rutkowski, M.
1990 *Labor Hoarding and Future Open Unemployment in Eastern Europe: The Case of Polish Industry*, Centre for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper No. 6, July, London School of Economics.
1991 *Is the Labor Market Adjustment in Poland Surprising?*, Paper presented to the conference "The Restructuring of Labor Markets in Eastern Europe", Milano, Italy, June 13-14.
Sachs, J.D.
1990 *A Tremor, Not Necessarily a Quake, for Poland*, "International Herald Tribune", No. 30, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire

Hans J. Eysenck
University of London & Maudsley Hospital, London

Clothbound 192 pages

CONTENTS

Freud the Man
Psychoanalysis as a Method of Treatment
Freud and the Development of the Child
The Interpretation of Dreams
The Experimental Study of Freudian Concepts
Psycho-babble and Pseudo-history
Bibliography and Indexes

The author, who may claim to be the world's most frequently cited psychologist, argues that Freudian psychoanalysis is largely imaginative, lacks experimental justification, and is totally lacking in any claim to scientific authenticity. There are many who will challenge the arguments and conclusions of this world-renowned author, but none will challenge the vitality of this stimulating text.

ISBN 1-87465-01-5: Price $35.00

Scott-Townsend Publishers
P.O. Box 34070
N.W. Washington D.C. 20043

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATE CONTROL, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND COMPETITION AMONG INTEREST GROUPS FOR GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS IN AFRICA

John Mukum Mbaku
Weber State University

At independence, many African countries chose the path of state control and economic planning to confront the problems of poverty and deprivation. Their approach emphasized state control and de-emphasized private initiative. The reliance on development planning as a way to introduce industrialization programs politicized economic markets and allowed policy makers to manipulate economic outcomes. It put enormous resources at the control of government bureaucrats. The allocation of resources through the political process has contributed significantly to poor economic growth as resources are squandered by interest groups.

In many African countries, political monopolies must continually furnish their supporters with "rental increases" if they are to remain in power. In addition, resources must be made available to group members to monitor the activities of competitors to ensure that no rival groups develop a violence potential that might threaten the security of the government or subsequently of the rent stream of the dominant group. These activities increase the importance of resource allocation in the political system. In this article, we shall attempt to show that post-independence development planning in Africa has politicized resource allocation and led to the emergence of many interest groups, each seeking transfers from the government.

Weakness Of Bureaucratic Planning

Development planning in African countries has allowed governments to control the allocation of investment expenditures through domestic development banks, national investment companies, and special parastatal agencies designed to meet the credit needs of certain sectors of the economy, such as rural

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

farming. These agencies are managed by bureaucrats who are selected from the politically-dominant group and they represent a vehicle by which the incumbent distributes resources to his supporters. In drawing up such development programs, the incumbent's representatives on the planning boards emphasize projects in areas in which members of the dominant group currently operate or control businesses, making it possible for these entrepreneurs to obtain 'loans' at very favorable interest rates. Thus, national priority areas for development are chosen to function as a vehicle for corrupt government transfers.

In those African economies in which there is significant government regulation – and these are in a majority – economic development is widely influenced by the activities of interest groups seeking transfers – and this includes many of the bureaucrats and regulators. The equilibrium that results in each economy is one in which some interest groups benefit at the expense of others. The behavior-type most often associated with interest groups in these economies is rent-seeking, or the expending of resources to capture artificially-created transfers. As a result, rent-seeking usually has a direct correlation with the level of government activity in the economy (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974; Tollison, 1982; Kimenyi, 1989).

Nepotic Practices

The types of rent-seeking behaviors developed by competitive interest groups will be determined by the structure of government in the country. In democratic systems, the most important rent-seeking behaviors are lobbying, bribery and contributions to the campaigns of legislators. In nondemocratic systems, political violence usually represents the most important rent-seeking behavior. In many African countries, government regulations are so restrictive that numerous economic agents have come to regard them as being impenetrable by traditional rent-seeking methods, such as bribery or lobbying. Excluded groups begin to view the system of resource allocation as one that has been designed to benefit primarily the politically powerful groups. If members of these excluded groups are unable to penetrate the dominant in-group, and as a result

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continue to be denied transfers, they may attempt to capture the rent-creating apparatus of government. Since constitutionally-determined methods for regime change usually do not function in these countries, such groups commonly resort to political violence. In the majority of African countries, incumbents rarely permit political competition, and as a result, individuals seeking political advancement come to rely on non-constitutional methods, such as violence. Thus, military *coups d'état* have become an important part of political life in many African countries (Kimenyi, 1989; Mbaku and Paul, 1989).

Many African countries are ruled by dictators, most of whom are leaders of politically-dominant groups. The dictator has a monopoly on legislation, rules by decree, and creates rents to benefit himself and the members of the interest group that put him in power and protect his political monopoly. Thus, if competing interest groups attempt to lobby or bribe the dictator in order to obtain rents for themselves, he is unlikely to respond favorably to such efforts. The African dictator, however, is aware of the threat of entry by competing group élites. As a result, he may from time to time find it convenient to bribe élites whose groups have developed significant violence potential in order to prevent the destabilization of his regime. The incumbent's ability to stay in power in many African countries requires that the flow of rents to members of the politically-dominant group be maintained, even during times of economic hardship. If the economy suffers a setback, resulting in a decrease in the government's revenue base, the incumbent still must ensure that the rent stream of the group that protects his monopoly on power is not affected. Incumbents must therefore continuously seek ways to obtain funds to 'bribe' their protectors if they are to stay in power. A political resource allocation system allows the dictator to control significant resources and to appropriate public funds to ensure regime security (Anderson, 1988; Mbaku, forthcoming).

Incumbent governments frequently choose to refuse to bribe competing groups, and instead they may resort to force to prevent these from initiating destabilizing behavior. The use of force to keep interest groups in line will invariably increase the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government's dependence on the military.

The Role of the Military

In 1989, Mbaku and Paul presented evidence to show that political violence is an important rent-seeking behavior in Africa. As discussed earlier, the African dictator restructures property rights to allow transfers to flow to competing power groups in response to lobbying. Only occasionally does he find it convenient to bribe them into compliance. As a result, many African interest groups have come to realize that the most appropriate way to avail group members of rents created by government activity in the economy is to capture the apparatus of government. Since the capture of the apparatus of government in these primarily autocratic regimes requires significant levels of violence, it appears that interest groups must develop a comparative advantage in violence if they are to succeed in overthrowing the government or force an attenuation of the government's property rights. Among interest groups in Africa, the military represents the group with the greatest level of potential violence. As a result, in post-independence African political economy, the armed forces have become a significant player in the political competition for resources (Mbaku, 1988; Mbaku and Paul, 1989; Mbaku, forthcoming).

Military and Political Groups Compete for Resources

The military currently participates in the political resource allocation system in many African countries in two ways. In other countries (e.g. Nigeria) the military has captured the apparatus of government and together with civilian bureaucrats rules the country. Many military élites have acquired controlling positions in the institutions responsible for resource allocation. Through significant budgetary discretion, bureaucrats are able to facilitate the transfer of wealth to group members. Other African countries are ruled by civilian dictators whose regimes are protected by the military. In exchange for protecting the dictator's monopoly on legislation, the military leaders receive significant transfers from the government.

Once the apparatus of government has been captured

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through a military coup, the military will move quickly to secure its rent stream. Next, the military élite will design a system to monitor competing group activities to ensure that the opposition does not develop the ability to successfully challenge its power. Where an autocratic civilian government is protected by the armed forces, the military will exhibit similar behavior patterns. As long as the incumbent continues to favor the military in resource allocation, the latter will defend and protect its rent stream by making sure that competing groups do not develop the violence potential needed to either overthrow or significantly threaten the security of the government. Since the early 1960s, when many African countries began to gain independence, the military has gradually increased its involvement in government in Africa. Today, most African countries are either governed by military elites or are ruled by governments that must rely on the armed forces for regime security. A significant contributor to the emergence of the military as an important determinant of regime security has been the politicization of resource allocation in many of these countries.

Table 1 presents data on military expenditures as a percentage of central government expenditures for selected African countries. These data reveal the relative magnitude of transfers to the military in these countries. As the data show, in 1977, as much as a quarter or more of total central government expenditures were allocated to the military in at least five African countries. The military received more than 40 percent of central government expenditures in Egypt in 1977. Although military appropriations as a percentage of total central government expenditures appear to have decreased in many African countries in the 1980s, from their high levels in the 1970s, the military still continues to receive a relatively large portion of government expenditures in many of these countries (see Table 1). This does not take account of the transfers of wealth to the families and civilian relatives of the military leaders by nepotic practices in the allocation of non-military payments or economic privileges.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Urban-based Groups Dominate Resource Allocation

Among interest groups seeking government transfers in Africa, those that have their base in the urban areas appear to exercise considerable influence on public policy regarding resource allocation. Civil servants represent one of the most important urban-based interest groups in Africa, and hence significant advantages over other groups because of the unique relationship that exists between them and the country's political leadership. In many African countries, as is the case of other countries in which resource allocation has been politicized, bureaucrats provide the skills and expertise needed to keep the huge political resource allocation system working. They help extract the rents needed to purchase security for the dictator's regime. In exchange for these services, bureaucrats receive transfers that can be channelled to them through wages and salaries that do not reflect productivity levels. Civil service salaries in most African countries are not comparable to those paid to their counterparts in business and industry, but they benefit from their powers of nepotism and patronage. As a result, their real income and benefits may actually be higher than is justified by output levels or opportunity cost.

Most public administration experts recommend that the percentage of the national budget devoted to public sector salaries and wages should not exceed a 10 percent ceiling (Kurian, 1984, p. 116). Table 2 provides information on expenditures on the civil service as a percentage of the total budget for selected African countries. As the data show, in 1980, almost 56 percent of the national budget in Mali was spent on salaries and wages for civil servants. With the notable exception of the Sudan, which spent only 11.55 percent of its national budget on wages and salaries for civil servants in 1980, the majority of African countries devoted at least 20 percent of their national budgets to bureaucratic compensation (see Table 2 and Kurian, 1984, p. 117).

In addition to civil servants, urban dwellers may represent a formidable interest group. Urbanites are generally very active politically and, as a result, are often able to influence public policy. It must be noted, however, that urbanites are not a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1

Military expenditures as a percentage of central government expenditures, selected African countries.

Country	1977	1980	1987
Ethiopia	29.2	38.0	24.0
Zambia	33.0	30.6	19.6a
Mozambique	15.6	27.8	34.6
Libya	25.6	26.6	40.0a
Zimbabwe	20.1	24.9	11.6
Uganda	21.0	24.4	15.6a
Mauritania	39.2	24.2	25.0a
Morocco	16.5	20.8	20.0a
South Africa	17.7	19.3	14.7
Somalia	16.2	18.4	30.0a
Burundi	12.4	17.8	12.7
Burkina Faso	20.8	17.7	17.6
Senegal	16.4	16.7	6.7
Sudan	12.7	16.6	7.0a
Egypt	40.4	15.7	22.3
Kenya	11.1	15.3	8.0
Madagascar	12.8	13.5	7.2a
Nigeria	14.4	13.5	2.7

a= latest estimate

Source: U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (1989). *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1988*. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

homogeneous group. They include military élites, cabinet ministers, retailers and other entrepreneurs, college professors and other professionals, and union leaders.

The Rural Sector

The rural sector is of basic importance to African economies. Apart from the fact that it is literally the 'food basket' of most African countries, this sector, through its agricultural activities, also contributes significantly to the gross national product. In addition, it employs a significant part of national labor resources. For example, World Bank data show that in 1980 the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture ranged from a low of 17 percent in South Africa to a high of 93 percent in Burundi and Rwanda (World Bank, 1988, pp. 282-283). In terms of contribution to the GNP, agriculture accounted for as much as 59 percent of GNP in Tanzania in 1986. Although agriculture contributed only 4 percent to GNP in Botswana in 1986, this sector remains the most important economic unit of most African countries (World Bank, 1988, pp. 226-227).

In addition to feeding the country and providing employment opportunities for a significant part of the population, the agricultural sector in many African countries is also the source of a large part of the resources used by the government to subsidize politically active groups. With the help of civil servants, the government extracts a significant surplus from the agricultural sector and uses the funds to purchase regime security. Rent extraction from this sector is undertaken in two ways. First, the government establishes price control regimes which force foodstuff prices below their equilibrium (market) levels, allowing urban dwellers to receive significant benefits. Second, the government places restrictions on the ability of farmers to export their commodities. Commodities must be sold to government parastatal agencies (usually called marketing boards), which have a monopoly on the export of these products. The state agencies purchase crops from farmers at below world market prices and sell them competitively abroad. The surplus so extracted becomes part of the pool of resources available to the dictator for the purpose of providing transfers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2

Expenditures on the civil service as a percentage of total budget, selected African countries.

Country	Year	Expenditures on civil service as a % of total budget
Mali	1980	55.88
Senegal	1980	42.73
Zaire	1979	41.57
Liberia	1981	39.17
Djibouti	1979	37.96
Ethiopia	1978	36.27
Swaziland	1980	35.80
Morocco	1980	32.86
Cameroon	1980	31.64
Mauritania	1979	31.08
Sierra Leone	1977	30.44
Rwanda	1979	28.48
Tanzania	1978	28.26
Tunisia	1980	27.65
Ghana	1980	26.41
Kenya	1980	25.35
Côte d'Ivoire	1980	24.96
Botswana	1980	24.85

Source: Thomas G. Kurian. (1984). *The new book of world rankings*. New York: Facts on File Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to his supporters and purchasing security for his regime.

How does the agricultural sector fare in the political competition for resources? Except for a few countries, most farming in Africa is undertaken by peasants, the majority of whom live in ethnic-based rural villages. Most of these farmers are geographically dispersed, and usually are unable to communicate well with farmers from other ethnic groups or geographic regions. Unlike urban-based groups, farm groups have not been very successful at influencing the government. African governments continue to exploit the agricultural sectors of their countries to benefit themselves and their supporters.

The Significance of Ethnicity

In countries where violence represents the most important rent-seeking behavior, interest groups entering the political competition for rents must be able to develop the violence potential needed to either overthrow the government or threaten it significantly enough to gain access to rents. Few post-colonial African countries comprise a single, homogeneous ethnic population, and in many the political competitors for rents consequently have an ethnic base, membership in interest groups being determined by the population of each ethnic group. Smaller ethnic groups as a result may fail to develop any significant levels of influence.

Olson (1982) has argued that smaller groups, in general, tend to be more successful at influencing the political process in unstable societies than larger ones. Small groups, he argues, are better organized than larger ones, and "can be discreet and inconspicuous...," thereby escaping the wrath of the dictator who usually does not support the development of independent groups (Olson, 1982: 162). But such small groups must be able to collude in order to achieve the optimal size needed to succeed at rent seeking. If violence is the most important means of engaging in the political competition for rents, then the achievement of optimal size is essential if the interest group is to develop the violence potential needed to allow it to participate gainfully in rent seeking. What constitutes optimal group size in a developing country will be determined primarily by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of competing interest groups the technological and military sophistication of group members, and the ability of the group to project itself as a strong and powerful competitor. An interest group composed of members of the armed forces may require less members to attain optimal size than one made up of, say, rural farmers.

Most ethnic groups in developing countries are distinguished by language, religion, culture, and geographic location. These characteristics, especially language and differences in culture, make communication between groups very difficult. In addition, the different experiences of these groups in contact with Europeans during colonial times increased inter-ethnic conflicts over resource allocation. In many African countries, for example, those ethnic groups located at the coast or close to it were the first to come into contact with European culture. By the time these countries gained independence, most of the educated African élites who served as a liaison between the indigenous people and the colonial government also came from these groups, and as a result, it was to these individuals who primarily benefited when the colonialists handed over the apparatus of government. They came to dominate post-independence government and resource allocation. Members of less fortunate ethnic groups envy these politically-dominant ethnic groups for existing inequalities in income distribution and widespread poverty among the former, and, there has been significant tension between politically-dominant ethnic groups and the exploited groups in many African countries.

What about logrolling, the process in which interest groups may trade political support on one issue for support on another? Since the legislatures in most African countries usually do not function properly or independently – acting instead to 'rubber-stamp' laws initiated by the dictator – trading of votes becomes a meaningless exercise. Support trading may only be used by groups which occupy an influential or powerful position. In many African countries, as discussed earlier, government price control programs which make foodstuffs cheap for the politically-active urban dwellers represent an implicit tax on those who produce food. Such price control

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

programs are usually effected in response to lobbying from urban groups. Producers of cash crops, such as coffee and cocoa, suffer from similar regulation. Since most cash crops are purchased by government parastatal agencies, or marketing boards, for subsequent export, the government is able to extract a significant surplus from producers through the purchase of these crops at below-market prices. A broadly based collaboration of farm groups could theoretically give agricultural producers the power to successfully challenge the cooperatives and the urban political influence on the government. Such collaboration, however, has hardly taken place, and as a result, both cash-crop and foodstuff producers continue to be exploited. The agricultural sectors of most African countries are dominated by individuals belonging to relatively small ethnic groups. Furthermore, when the colonial powers granted independence to these African colonies no attempt was made to ensure that the new states represented ethnically homogeneous entities, and consequently the potential for the exploitation of the ethnic groups by dominant tribes was enhanced. These groups, in most cases, have not been very successful in their attempts to influence the government (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Becker, 1983; Olson, 1982).

In a society in which there is a significantly large number of relatively small ethnic groups, collusion is rarely feasible, and as a result, the activities of these groups may not lead to the formation of the political cartels that can facilitate rent seeking. In such societies, then, most successful rent seeking may be limited to groups that are better organized and are more likely to cooperate, such as urbanites, civil servants, and the military. It is important to note that ethnicity often appears as an important element in urban-based groups. Ethnicity within the urban setting, however, serves to minimize organizational and other transaction costs. Urbanization appears to improve the ability of these groups to cooperate and become more politically active.

Summary and Conclusion

At independence, a large number of African countries chose

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an economic development path that emphasized state control and significant levels of economic regulation. Leaders of many emerging African countries claimed that the choice of an institutional framework based on state control and economic planning was necessitated by the existence of significantly high levels of poverty and deprivation in their economies. In order to break this "cycle of poverty," these leaders argued, an institutional framework that allowed the government to have significant control over resource allocation was needed. Thus, after independence was achieved, many of these countries chose political systems that denigrated or at least de-emphasized individual initiative. The choice of statism instead of individualism politicized resource allocation in these countries and allowed policy makers to manipulate economic outcomes to benefit themselves and their supporters.

The adoption of a political resource allocation system which has enabled bureaucrats and rulers to structure property rights so that the benefits of economic activity accrue to members of the politically-dominant group. Locked-out groups often resort to violence in an attempt to capture the apparatus of government. The purpose of securing state power is seldom deregulation of the economy at the introduction of competitive markets but almost invariably the restructuring of property rights to redirect benefits to the new set of autocrats and their supporters. Since constitutional methods of regime change do not exist in these countries (or function improperly), individuals seeking to capture the apparatus of government commonly resort to violence. The rise of political violence in these countries has allowed the armed forces, which have the comparative advantage in violence, to emerge as an important factor in resource allocation. State control and centrally-directed development planning has thus politicized resource allocation and resulted in significant levels of corruption, nepotism and exploitation.

REFERENCES

Anderson, G. M.
1988 Public finance in autocratic process: An empirical note. *Public Choice* 57:25-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Becker, Gary S.
1983 A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98(4): 371-400.
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G.
1962 The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Kimenyi, M. S.
1989 Interest groups, transfer seeking and democratization: Competition for the benefits of government power may explain African political instability. *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 48(3): 339-349.
Krueger, A. O.
1974 The political economy of the rent-seeking society. *American Economic Review* 63 (June): 291-303.
Kurian, G. T.
1984 The new book of world rankings. New York: Facts on File.
Mbaku, John M. (forthcoming).
Military expenditures and bureaucratic competition for rents. *Public Choice*.
Mbaku, John, and Paul, Chris.
1989 Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach. *Public Choice* 63 (October): 63-72
Mbaku, J. M.
1988 Political instability and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa: Some recent evidence. *The Review of Black Political Economy* 17(1): 89-112.
Olson, Mancur
1982 The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Tollison, R. D.
1982 Rent seeking: A survey. *Kyklos* 35:575-602.
Tullock, G.
1967 The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. *Western Economic Journal* 5 (June): 224-232.
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
1989 World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1988. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
World Bank
1988 World development report, 1988. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank
1989 World tables, 1988-89. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Univ. Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RACE DIFFERENCES: AN OVERVIEW

Michael Levin[1]
The City University of New York

In a memorable passage of his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* the philosopher David Hume takes up the problem of evil. His particular concern is the familiar theistic argument that the evils of the world do not tell against God's existence, since they might be explained by aspects of God we do not understand. Hume's reply is devastating. *If* we already knew that God exists, he says, we would be justified in holding evil to be compatible with his existence, and belief in God in the face of evil would remain rational. But we do *not* know this; our problem is precisely to determine whether God exists from "known phenomena," the evidence at hand. And that determination, Hume continues, depends on the answer to the following questions. If we knew nothing whatever about the universe beforehand, *what sort of universe would we expect to find if God exists? Is the world we actually see that sort of world?* If not, belief in God is irrational. We may "pile conjectures atop hypotheses" to reconcile God with known phenomena, but the whole structure lacks a foundation if there is no independent evidence for God in the first place.

The present evidential situation with regard to race differences in intelligence and other traits may be summarized similarly. If we knew nothing beforehand about the distribution of intelligence by race, *what sort of world would we expect to find if the average intelligence of the races were equal? Do the known phenomena resemble that world, or the world we would expect to find if the races* differed *in average intelligence*? It is difficult to deny that the world we see is of this latter sort. The races differentiate on psychometric tests, in the design of their own societies, and within everyday experience. If we already knew *a priori* the

---

1. For detailed documentation, see my "Implications of Race and Sex Differences for Compensatory Affirmative Action and the Concept of Discrimination." *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Volume 15, No. 2, Summer 1990: pp. 175-212.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

races to be of equal average intelligence, these appearances could be explained by suitable auxiliary hypotheses. But as we do not know this, such "explanations" are bound to be *ad hoc*.

In more contemporary terms, observation contradicts the testable consequences of the null hypothesis that race is uncorrelated with intelligence. The null hypothesis has been disconfirmed, its likelihood shown to fall below some rejection level. Often the spirit of scientific caution moves scientists to formulate this result as the non-existence of evidence for the null hypothesis. This formulation is satisfactory, but only so long as Hume continues to remind us that there would have been evidence for the null hypothesis were it true. The absence of evidence favorable to equality is, in this instance, evidence against it.

I will not attempt to exhaust the known differences between Negroids, Caucasoids and Mongoloids. Rather, I will outline these differences and their social and philosophical significance, and also speculate about the sources of resistance to recognizing these differences.

The most salient race difference, one whose mention is apt to excite fury, is that in intelligence. The mean Negroid score on a variety of predictively valid intelligence tests falls about one standard deviation below the mean Caucasoid score. When the mean white score is scaled at 100, the mean black score is about 85. There is some evidence of a smaller black variance, which further reduces high tail representation for blacks. Mongoloids, on the other hand, outperform Caucasoids on intelligence tests, particularly those portions concerned with non-verbal mathematical and spatial reasoning, although the overall difference is less than 1 SD. The Mongoloid/Caucasoid gap occasions little distress; most discussion focusses on the Caucasoid-Negroid gap, and that phenomenon does indeed raise the gravest questions.

A common misconstruction of these data, namely that "IQ tests only measure IQ-test-taking ability," is of some philosophical interest. Logically, the charge is rebutted by the predictive validity of IQ tests for independently specified factors such as grades, income, job status, job performance and ordinary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

judgements of intelligence; if IQ were a test artifact, grades would be no more predictable from IQ than from the sum of the digits of student telephone numbers. Many critics of testing are simply unaware of the positive correlations between IQ and other variables, but even those aware of such correlations underestimate their significance. They take test scores, however reliable, to reveal no underlying reality; "There's no such thing as intelligence," as another slogan has it. The interpretation of IQ thus intersects the debate about the reality of theoretical constructs, in full generality the issue of "scientific realism." Without rehearsing the entire debate, I'll note one irony. The idea that IQ tests nothing beyond itself seemed plausible in the heyday of logical positivism, roughly 1930-1960, when scientific knowledge was thought to be exhausted by relations between observables. Positivists associated a distinct concept with each distinct test procedure, thus distinguishing, for instance, distance-as-measured-by-yardstick from distance-as-measured-by-parallax. *Distance* as a quantity measured by both yardsticks and angular displacement was dismissed as gratuitous. It eventually became clear that concepts were being multiplied far beyond necessity, and by the mid-1970's most philosophers of science agreed that correlated tests generally indicate some common, real, underlying, factor. Yardsticks do measure what angular displacement measures. In other words, what remains the standard objection to intelligence testing has for decades been regarded as passé and doctrinaire when applied to all other areas of science. Indeed, I have heard adamant philosophical realists about esoteric postulates of physics confidently deny there is any such thing as intelligence.

When acknowledged, the predictive validity of intelligence tests is often taken to indicate no more than the extent of bias against blacks. If IQ predicts black as well as white criterion performance, this is because the criteria as well as the tests are discriminatory. (That the same reasoning implies systematic bias favoring Asians is seldom mentioned.) It is characteristic of this view that the source of bias is not independently specified; rather, disparate criterion performance is itself taken as proof of criterion bias, and a reason for dismissing studies which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control for antecedently designated bias. Hume's point is again decisive. While indefinitely adjustable appeals to criterion bias may establish the *possibility* of racial equality in intelligence, they do not *support* it. Underperformance in educational attainment, occupational attainment, income and law-abidingness are *not* what one would expect from racial equality of intelligence.

One would think it obvious that the IQ data concern differences in phenotypic rather than genotypic intelligence, but in my experience egalitarians *immediately* interpret the data as concerning genotypic intelligence and *immediately* attack the data under that confused and uncharitable interpretation. The polemical advantages of so doing are obvious. Genotypic variance is a (rather natural) *explanation* of some of the phenotypic variance, and the evidence for any explanatory hypothesis *must* be weaker than the evidence for the datum to be explained. Conflating genotypic and phenotypic issues thereby makes the datum of race difference itself appear speculative and uncertain.

Willful misunderstanding is not easy to dispel, but I find it helpful to distinguish three levels of mental ability. There are, at the first level, specific abilities: tying one's shoes, speaking French, discriminating prime from composite numbers. One level up is phenotypic intelligence, the *ability to acquire first-level abilities*. Intelligence, as a developed product of genes and environment, is the ability to learn to tie one's shoes, to learn French, to learn to discriminate prime numbers. Observed interpersonal intelligence differences are differences in the ability to acquire abilities.

Most people willing to discuss intelligence (rather than simply get angry) will accept this distinction and acknowledge a race difference in average learning ability. But they decline to call it a difference in intelligence because of the mediating role of environment in the development of learning ability, and because of the unarticulated assumption that everyone is born with the same ability to acquire the ability to acquire abilities. At any rate, individual differences in this third-level disposition are tacitly assumed to be uncorrelated with race. Now, it is this third-level disposition – the tendency to develop learning ability

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

– that is precisely genotypic intelligence. Indeed, most people use "intelligence" to mean "what is innate, not environmentally mediated," which is quite close to genotypic intelligence. However, when genotypic and phenotypic intelligence are conflated, this ordinary usage fosters two mistakes. The first is that genotypically identical individuals whose phenotypic learning abilities differ are *really* equally able to learn. (This error is particularly likely if genotypic intelligence is assumed everywhere equal.) In fact, such individuals are *not* equally (phenotypically) intelligent, although their phenotypic differentiation has been environmentally caused. If as a result of greater exposure to the sun I now have less hair than someone equally genetically prone to baldness, I really am balder. The second mistake, tending in the opposite direction, is to reject genotypic intelligence as unimportant or logically incoherent because its expression must be mediated environmentally. This error is especially tempting if there are thought to be some environments which would produce equal learning ability in genotypically distinct individuals. This inference is also fallacious. That Einstein might have ended up no more intelligent than the average person had he spent his first ten years in a closet does not make the average person Einstein's genetic equal. Equal genotypic intelligence implies the development of the same phenotypic intelligence in the *same* environment.

Both points bear on racial justice. Even if mean Negroid genotypic intelligence equals that of Caucasoids, their observed phenotypic differentiation would still amount to an unequal ability to learn. Nor would this phenotypic differentiation be "unfair," even if environmentally caused, unless human agency produced the differentiating environments. Conversely, even if phenotypes could be equalized by manipulating environments – which actually seems empirically unlikely – justice would not necessarily demand intervention. Justice is equal treatment; justice would not demand that white children be forbidden to read until the age of eighteen, for instance, if such means were necessary for equalizing black and white intellectual attainment.

Once genotypic intelligence is identified, its distribution by race becomes a straightforward empirical question. Evidencing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

individual or group genotypic differentiation does not require the observation of phenotypic differences in no environment, or an exhaustive specification of the environments which mediate their expression. All that is needed is evidence, possibly indirect, of the similarity of the environments of phenotypically differentiated individuals or groups. The caloric intake of identical twins raised together, for instance, can reasonably be assumed to be similar even absent a precise calorie count.

In fact, there is considerable evidence that environmental differences account for half or less of phenotypic intelligence. The most compelling evidence is the negative correlation between degree of genetic relatedness and IQ difference; the IQs of identical twins reared together or apart, for instance, are closer than those of fraternal twins reared together or apart.[2] This conclusion is reinforced by the marked depression of IQ with inbreeding, which suggests the control of low intelligence by a recessive allele.

To be sure, the .5+ heritability of IQ for individuals is consistent with the mean racial differences being wholly environmental in origin. There might conceivably be an environmental factor found in Africa, the Caribbean and parts of the US which affects Negroids only. However, no independent evidence for such a factor exists, and black children adopted by white families do not develop IQs equal to those of their adoptive siblings. Again, one can posit intrafamilial or pre-adoption environment differences, but so far as I know there has been no serious study of the effect on adoptees of any antecedently specified factor. Such conjectures may show the consistency of extant adoption studies with the hypothesis of equal racial genotypes, but the upshot of these studies is not what the null hypothesis predicts.

It should be added that twin and adoption studies have also examined neuroticism, activity level and extraversion, personali-

---

2. See T. Bouchard, et al, "Sources of Human Psychological Differences: the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart," *Science* 250 (12 October 1990): 223-228. Bouchard et al put the heritability of IQ at .7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ty dimensions along which the races are also observed to differ.[3] And just as it is natural to generalize the heritability of individual differences in intelligence to mean race differences, a similar extrapolation is natural for observed noncognitive race differences.

Strongly indicative of a genetic contribution to the race difference are the correlations between IQ and brain size, and the known racial differences in cranial volume and brain mass.[4]

It is difficult to see how the heritability of these physiological traits could fail to be high. Indeed, even the arch-dualist Descartes recognized an intimate connection between mental and physical processes. As the physiology of intelligence becomes clarified, racial egalitarians may be expected to embrace forms of dualism that would have mystified Descartes.

Although difficult to measure, the differences between the cultures of Europe, Asia and Africa offer qualitative support for innate race differences in intelligence. Despite current efforts by educators to inflate the achievements of sub-Saharan Africans – largely by assimilating Egypt to the sub-Saharan cultures – it seems reasonably clear that no Negroid culture ever developed a written language, mathematical notation, or mechanical devices (although there seems to have been some knowledge of metallurgy). One of the most belligerent Africanist claims is that there is no trace now of an African science and philosophy because they were stolen from Africa by the Greeks. It is difficult to see how abstract speculation could be pursued without mathematics or writing; in any case stolen knowledge – unlike stolen physical property – is not usually lost to its original owners.

I take it as clear that, absent external intervention, a culture is a product of the aggregated genotypes of its members

---

3. On the heritability of personality traits, see R. Plomin, "The Role of Inheritance in Behavior," *Science* 248 (13 April 1990): 183-188.

4. See e.g. Beals, K. L. et al, "Brain Size, Cranial Morphology, Climate and Time Machines," *Current Anthropology* 25 (1984): 301-330. Also see Gordon, C. C. et al, *1988 Anthropometric Survey of US Army Personnel: Summary Statistics Interim Report*. U.S. Army Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center, Natick, Mass., 1988. During a public lecture at the American Museum of Natural History, Harold Jerrison confirmed the existence of nontrivial race differences in brain size.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mediated by their physical environment. There are no other independent causal variables. Since the skills needed to create a technical culture are highly correlated with intelligence at the individual level, a culture's technological level may be taken to reflect the average genotypic intelligence of its members. Although there may have been individuals of genius during Africa's history, they evidently appeared with insufficient frequency to sustain a technology comparable to those of Europe or Asia.

The evolutionary origin of the intelligence difference must be more speculative. One view regards the intelligence difference as a byproduct of an independent adaptation. It has been suggested, for instance, that the more conical Negroid skull radiates heat more efficiently and that this adaptation to the African climate constrained cerebral development. A second approach emphasizes the direct fitness enhancement conferred by intelligence and asks why higher intelligence might have been more adaptive in Europe and Asia than in Africa. Perhaps the ability to plan offers more bang for the metabolic buck in cold, predictable environments. These uncertainties do not undermine the evidence for differences themselves, any more than the failure of biologists to discover the function of the earlobe disproves the high heritability of earlobe possession. One must certainly dismiss as unscientific the argument of Gould that insufficient time has passed for the races to have diverged. There has manifestly been time for divergence with respect to some polygenic traits, such as facial bone structure. Anyway, the Gould argument reverses the proper direction of inference. If the races do diverge genetically with respect to intelligence, it follows that the time available – seemingly about 110,000 years – was sufficient for such divergence.

While the noncognitive differences between the races, noted earlier, might be expressed in terms of motivation or gratification deferment, the language of time preference carries the fewest unwanted moralistic connotations. Briefly, an individual's preference for the present over the future is measured by the future payment he will accept for foregoing a dollar today. The higher the payment, the higher his time preference. In these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terms, Negroid time preferences appear to be considerably higher than Caucasoid (which in turn appear to be higher than Mongoloid). According to J. P. Rushton's survey and reanalysis of available data, Negroids, when compared to Caucasoids, are more violent, more prone to crime, more excitable, more impulsive, more extroverted, less sexually restrained, less inclined to follow rules, less co-operative and less altruistic – all behavioral dispositions involving choice of a present good. The apparent cross-cultural constancy of this race difference, as indicated for instance by crime figures, implicates a significant genetic component. Certainly, conventional environmental explanations of the time preferences of American blacks in terms of the black "value system" or conditions in black slums are hopelessly circular. What needs explaining is the black "value system" itself and the tendency of blacks to produce less prosperous material conditions when no external constraints are operating. Race differences in time preference may be in part a consequence of the intelligence differences, since a less clear conceptualization of the future is less apt to influence behavior. We may be sure that black time preferences must have been adaptive, or not seriously maladaptive, in the environments in which blacks evolved.

Before leaving noncognitive race differences, I would mention perhaps the most tabooed: perception of and bodily response to rhythm. Rhythm plays a larger role in black music, and melody, harmony and structure a smaller role, than in European music. (I can't speak of Asian.) Blacks developed jazz, rhythm and blues, rock 'n' roll and rap – the last a form in which rhythm displaces tonality altogether. The Dogon ritual dances filmed by Levi-Strauss in the 1930's are similar to the play dances of little girls in Harlem filmed by the Museum of the City of New York in the early 1960's; both are more syncopated and rhythmically emphatic than the gavotte or polka. The evolutionary origin of this aspect of Negroid culture and its connection to personality may well repay investigation.

Race differences in intelligence and motivation are of the greatest significance for American society. Blacks currently constitute about 12% of the population and are reproducing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more rapidly than whites. I have seen it estimated that 25% of the population will be black and less than 50% white by the middle of the next century. This contingency was not foreseen by the founding fathers, and it is an open question whether liberal democracy can be sustained by a population whose mean intelligence and self-restraint fall sufficiently below Caucasoid norms.

My own interest in race differences has been largely explanatory and exculpatory. U.S. public policy currently awards preference to blacks over more qualified whites in hiring, promotion, training, academic admissions, the distribution of fellowships and virtually all other competitive activities. There has been some discussion of the harmful effects of "affirmative action," as this policy is euphemistically called, but it has not been sufficiently noted that known race differences rebut its basic rationale. Blacks are said to deserve preference as compensation for past wrongs which incapacitated them for competing with whites on equal terms. Preference now "makes them whole" by giving them the positions they would have earned had they or their ancestors been treated fairly. Superficial dissimilarities aside, this same argument underlies appeal to "role models": blacks do not have enough role models because of the past effects of discrimination. (If the relative paucity of black role models is a consequence of any other factor, genetic or environmental, justice would not require its correction.) It appears, however, that the current black shortfall in vocational and educational achievement is due completely to black levels of intelligence and motivation, not mistreatment. Whites might have harmed blacks in the past, but the effects of this harm have apparently been attenuated to non-existence. Since the black achievement shortfall is not a white-administered injury, whites do not owe blacks compensation for it.

Astonishingly, even sworn enemies of affirmative action are loathe to deploy this clear and decisive argument. The major conservative argument against affirmative action appears to be that it harms blacks by unfairly stigmatizing them. This argument is clearly ineffective if the basis of affirmative action is justice, since the question of just entitlement is independent of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the possible harm to the victim of claiming his entitlement. What is more, this conservative argument tacitly concedes the central moral point that it is the effect of social policy on blacks that ought to be the center of attention. Finally, this conservative argument is vulnerable to the possibility that blacks continue to underperform relative to whites and Asians after a level playing field has been restored. If all that is now keeping blacks back are the demoralizing lower standards of the liberal welfare state, blacks may be expected to keep up if those standards are raised. Should those standards be raised and blacks persistently fall behind, the only interpretation open to proponents of this conservative argument is that some further form of discrimination is at work. It is as its defenders of a castle were trying to repel its besieger with rocks while ignoring rifles in the armory.

The explanatory power of the IQ difference is perhaps most obvious in the case of school performance. Black children invariably perform more poorly than any other group, a situation for which "the system" – i.e. teachers and administrators – is usually blamed. It is simpler to suppose that black children do not learn as much or as quickly as white children because, as the evidence already indicates, they are less capable of learning. The IQ difference also explains the discrepancies in vocational achievement that immediately call forth affirmative action. Rather than repeat Linda Gottfredson's important results in this area, I will illustrate the point with a more personal example. A recent survey by the American Philosophical Association found that only 1.1% of its membership is black, a result taken to indicate "racism" within the profession compensable by preference for black philosophers. Since 12% of the population is black, runs the implicit argument, 12% of its philosophers should be expected to be black absent discrimination. But assume an IQ 1 SD above the mean – 115 – is necessary for earning the Ph.D. in philosophy. While 15.9% of the white population lies in this range, only 2.3% of the black population does. Since blacks are 12% of the population, black representation in the APA can be expected absent discrimination to fall below 2%. The IQ data thus explains 5/6 of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

representational discrepancy. In fact, this figure reflects several simplifying assumptions. One is the equality of black and white variance for IQ. It ignores the feedback effect, whereby greater white ability at tasks like philosophy creates traditions which reinforce the ability in "new" individuals. Finally, it ignores time-preference differences, in this case the greater average readiness of whites to prefer a future Ph.D. to the immediate goods that must be foregone to secure it.

The broad contours of the black/white income discrepancy are also explained if income is assumed to be a simple monotonic function of IQ. A 1973 article in the *American Economic Review* by Brown and Reynolds[5] explained some of the fine structure by allowing threshold increases of the "income coefficient" of IQ. In particular, the model partially explains the "overprediction" effect sometimes found when black criterion performance is predicted from the white regression line. Here again is a seemingly very fruitful line of inquiry; Prof. Reynolds has informed me, incidentally, that he has left this area because the reception of his paper was "unrewarding."

It seems likely that the higher time preferences of blacks explain much of the variance in black/white achievement not explained by IQ. Those with lower time preferences more readily invest their monetary and human capital and withstand discipline. Their greater tendency to conform to rules creates a more predictable social environment. They are better able to achieve economies of scale by undertaking large-scale tasks which require co-operation. Lower black economic and educational performance are often said to be caused by the high rates of disorder and family instability in black communities, but these phenomena are more plausibly viewed as further correlated expressions of black time preference. I have already noted the circularity of explaining black time preferences in terms of black poverty, and the further blow administered to the "cycle of poverty" idea by Korean grocers – the newest paradigm of low time preference – may account for the highly publicized

5. Brown, W. W. and M. O. Reynolds, "A Model of IQ, Occupation, and Earnings," *The American Economic Review* 65, 5 (December 1975): 1002-1007.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

black antagonism toward them. By showing prosperity to depend on endogenous worker traits rather than social attitudes or the treatment of one's ancestors, Korean merchants have inadvertently undercut the compensation argument and with it the main moral claim of blacks on American society.

Obviously, race differences also carry prospective economic implications. The tasks accomplished in an economy are determined by the skills of its workforce. Many of the tasks whose performance we now take for granted may cease to be done as blacks become a larger share of the workforce, bringing with it a drop in living standards. If demographics make such a decline inevitable, it is to be hoped that whites will have ceased blaming themselves by the time it has happened (and not guiltily accelerate the replacement of more productive white workers by less productive black ones). Particularly ominous in this connection is the Civil Rights Restoration Act, vetoed by George Bush in 1990 but at this writing again before Congress, which creates a presumption of illegality against any employment criterion on which blacks perform substantially less well than whites. Since virtually all vocational tasks make some demands on intelligence, and technically important tasks are highly "*g*-loaded," this law would effectively ban valid hiring standards. It would impose random task assignments on a large scale, no doubt a historical first whose results would be a natural economic experiment fascinating to anyone with no stake in its outcome.

A second issue that promises to become increasingly pressing is black crime. To put matters summarily, black crime (in conjunction with general disorder and indigence) is making the major American cities uninhabitable by white standards, and they are in fact being abandoned. That the black propensity to crime exceeds the white, perhaps by an order of magnitude, is not disputed. Deaths by murder vary in the US from .6 per 100,000 in states like Idaho, which have virtually no blacks, to over 100 per 100,000 in cities like Washington, D.C. and Detroit, which have a dense black population. 25% of black males spend time in prison. While there is now some public discussion of black crime, its emphasis is usually the greater

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

victimization of blacks, perpetrator identity being left to the imagination. What has not been remarked on is an apparent asymmetry in cross-racial crime. According to a recent Justice Department report[6] and unpublished figures communicated by the Justice Department to the author in a telephone interview, over 97% of the crimes committed by whites have white victims, while half or more of crimes committed by blacks have white victims. Since blacks constitute 12% of the population, whites attack blacks at about 1/4 the rate predicted by random choice of victims, while blacks attack whites at about 3/5 the predicted rate. Taking the ratio of these fractions as a measure of victim choice, black preference for white victims is 2.4 times that of white preference for black victims.

As always, the question is why, and, as always, environmental explanations are circular. Slum conditions cannot explain black crime, since "slum conditions" is just a name for phenomena that include black crime. White mistrust of blacks can explain the high rate of black-on-black crime only by tortuous causal assumptions, and, more important, white "stereotyping" of blacks as "more criminal" is best viewed as an effect of prior black behavior. We are driven once again to endogenous black traits. To be sure, there cannot literally be a genotypic proneness to crime, since the legal status of the same behavior will vary with regnant legal norms. There can however be differentiated genotypic propensities to behavior which as a matter of fact tends to be criminalized. Since Caucasoid legal codes function primarily to control aggression, higher Negroid levels of reactivity most simply explain black proneness to "crimes of violence." Greater black proneness to theft would be explained by lower levels of altruism, which facilitate the perception of other people as resources.

It is well to stress just here that descriptions of race differences in intelligence, motivation and even law-abidingness imply no moral evaluation. Low time preferences are neither better nor worse than higher ones. The social consequences of these

---

6. Whittaker, C., "Black Victims." *Office of Justice Programs*, US Dept. of Justice, April 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

differences can be contrasted without being judged. From within a Caucasoid value system – which was presumably directly or indirectly adaptive in the environments in which Caucasoids evolved – Negroids are too aggressive. But Negroid levels of aggression were also presumably adaptive in the environments in which Negroids evolved, and Caucasoids may well be viewed as deficient in aggression from within Negroid value systems. We don't rate feline dentition as superior or inferior to equine; evolution gave both cats and horses the teeth they needed when they were evolving. Western civilization may perhaps be "better" insofar as it achieves a goal common to all civilizations, namely prediction and control of nature – a goal most readily achievable by the scientific modes of thought developed in the West. I do not think this feature of our own culture can be erected into absolute normative superiority, but even if it could it would be important to remember the philosophical maxim that "Ought implies can." No-one can be criticized for not doing what he is unable to do. At an aggregate statistical level it may not be possible for blacks to satisfy white norms, just as it may not be possible for Europeans to veil their emotions to the extent said to be expected of Japanese. If so, blaming Negroids for deviation from white norms of self-restraint is as pointless as blaming cats for not eating hay.

I emphasize moral neutrality because, it seems to me, fear that acknowledging race differences involves condemning blacks contributes significantly to public aversion to the topic. The explanation of black underperformance via lower intelligence and higher time preferences is popularly equated with criticism of blacks for their genes. Most people value intelligence and impulse control, and tacitly impute their values to psychologists reporting the empirical data. This projection leads the ordinary person to construe reports of the data as adverse judgements, which he does not feel comfortable making.

Further confusion is sown by speaking of the "pathology" of urban black behavior, which suggests exogenously caused deviation from an unrealized norm. (The exogenous cause is usually racism). Now, so far as I can see, "normal" functioning for a species means nothing more than functioning that was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adaptive when the species was evolving. In that sense there may be nothing "abnormal" about black levels of altruism or aggression, if they express genotypes expressed adaptively during Negroid evolution. What complicates matters is that what may be "normal" Negroid cognitive and social functioning is perceived, rightly, as "abnormal" for Caucasoids, just as eating fish is "normal" for cats but not horses. It is difficult to appreciate that criteria of normality may differ by race.

A further source of moral resistance to race differences is the idea that what is genetic is the essence of personal identity. It is easy to imagine oneself having had a very different life history after birth, but many contemporary philosophers deny that you would have been you had "you" come from different sperm and egg, and common sense seems to agree. Consequently, the partial ascription of negatively valued traits like low intelligence to genetic causes is perceived as the ascription of a defect to the soul. Once again, people are intensely averse to ascribing defects to souls and for this reason recoil at the idea of genetic race differences in intelligence and self-restraint.

A further possible cause of resistance to the innateness hypothesis is sociological. That blacks are less intelligent and more impulsive than whites is a view associated with the American south, a region held in contempt by many educated northerners. The typical educated northerner will not easily admit to sharing a view about a socially important question with a less educated, lower-status white southerner.

A more fortuitous but weightier sociological factor was the war waged against innatists in the years just prior to the entrenchment of quotas. Numerical goals became regulative law in 1971 and did not pass Supreme Court scrutiny until 1978, but it was in 1969 that Arthur Jensen's famous *Harvard Educational Review* article occasioned an extended intellectual riot by suggesting that an innate black intellectual deficit might render useless the many federal programs intended to help black children. Jensen, Eysenck and other innatists were physically and verbally assaulted, their classes disrupted and their public appearances shouted down. A number of writers recommended that research into race differences be halted. In 1974 the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leading journal of social philosophy published an anti-Jensen polemic whose authors appeared to accept violence on the part of readers as a consequence of their attack. Typical of the period was a 1970 piece in *Scientific American* by Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza which concluded:

> In the present racial climate of the US, studies on racial differences in IQ, however well intentioned, could easily be misinterpreted as a form of racism and lead to an unnecessary accentuation of racial tensions. Since we believe that, for the present at least, no good case can be made for such studies on either scientific or practical grounds, we do not see any point in particularly encouraging the use of public funds for their support.[7]

Incidentally, Bodmer and Sforza's argument against the innateness of the intelligence gap was that, if African and Caucasian IQs are assumed to be the same, the present gap would have emerged only if 15% of the most intelligent blacks failed to reproduce in each generation since slavery. Obviously, the innateness hypothesis does not assume the equality of African and Caucasian IQs.

By 1972, then, educated white males had not only learned the cost in hostility of defending innateness, they had begun to internalize the cost as guilt. When compensatory preference was settling in during the 1970's, white males were too off-balance to articulate the most compelling argument in their own defense. Nor have they been allowed to regain their balance. In fact, sanctions against innatism are now harsher. Philippe Rushton has been investigated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for publishing his r/K theory. My own classes have been disrupted (the disrupters praised for their restraint by my college's President) and efforts have been made to break my tenure. And there are the innumerable unpleasant personal experiences, telephone calls, death threats, and obscene graffiti. The vague "anti-harassment" policies lately announced by many

---

7. Bodmer, W. and L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, "Intelligence and Race," *Scientific American* 223, 4 (Oct. 1970): 19-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

universities will certainly chill discussion further.

Black hostility to discussion of race differences is not surprising. As I have said, race differences in intelligence and time preferences undercut the principal black claim on the larger society, so that attributing crime, poverty and academic failure to victimization is more advantageous to blacks. White agreement is more perplexing. I do not think white guilt feelings stem from slavery, since I find it implausible that contemporary whites believe they are personally responsible for, or beneficiaries of, slavery. Nor do I think white guilt reflects fear of Nazism, whose resurgence no-one expects. Indeed, when it is recalled that it is the proponent of race differences who is likely to be harassed and physically attacked, it is the black militant and his allies who appear in the role of Nazis.

Part of the cause of white guilt may be the adverse implications of the innateness hypothesis. If the black achievement shortfall is not due to corrigible white misconduct, black academic failure and disorder are going to be permanent features of the social environment, a prospect most people prefer not to think about. I nonetheless conjecture that the primary cause of white guilt is white misinterpretation of black emotional reactivity and an overall mismatch between black emotional cues and white responses. White expectations about anger have been shaped during evolutionary history by dealings with other whites, and *among whites* the degree of belligerence displayed by blacks is normally caused by injury. More precisely, any given level of aggression is apt to be the observable correlate of more serious injury when reached by a Caucasoid than a Negroid. Unaccustomed to the different thresholds and occasions of aggressiveness for blacks, whites are disposed to interpret black anger directed at them as indicating the more serious injury such anger from whites would imply. In addition, high levels of guilt and solicitude may be evolved Caucasoid responses to the perception of injury. (Such responses would be adaptive for highly social animals.) Whites consequently blame themselves for black anger, and seek in turn to punish what provokes it. (Since the innateness hypothesis provokes intense black anger, it triggers corresponding distress in whites.) If

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is a biological component in white bafflement and guilt, honest discussions of race differences in the face of black anger will prove extremely difficult.

Value neutrality is desirable, but by common consent the consequences of the race differences are disturbingly problematic. The problem felt by most people to be most pressing may be crime. In my view, the use of some race-conscious procedures are both warranted and imperative. The first obligation of government is the protection of life and property, and ordinary morality allows some pre-emptive state actions to maintain it. "Probable cause" searches using factors known to increase the likelihood that a crime has been or will be committed, for instance, are regarded as justified. Since race is an information-bearing factor, the use of race in "suspect profiles" seems to me justified. It is certainly absurd to endorse race-conscious affirmative action to achieve (highly uncertain) compensation, but deny the use of race to secure safety. The limits of race-based crime prevention are difficult to set, but a thought experiment might prove instructive. There are about 30 murders per year committed on the New York subways, virtually all by young black males. Requiring black males to ride in special patrolled cars might avert many of them. Would such limited segregation justified? A not dissimilar proposal has been made by the current Superintendent of the NY public school system, although he has described his plan to reserve special subway cars for public school students – most of whom are black – as intended to protect them from crime (evidently conceived as an autonomous force). Certainly, more research is needed, and I pass on to you two lines of inquiry suggested to me by another philosopher, Eugene Valberg. First, has there been a change in the prevalence and character of black crime since the passage in 1964 of the Civil Rights Act? The annual homicide rate for New York in the 1950's was about 300; in 1990 it exceeded 2000. The great jump in the crime rate occurred between 1968 and the mid-1970's; was this acceleration replicated elsewhere? Second, what if any effect does the election of a black mayor have on a city's crime rate? As I have noted, black crime is customarily explained in terms of discrimi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation, lack of self-esteem, and other factors that have never been validated. An alternative hypothesis suggests that making blacks favorites of the law, a process which began in the 1960's, disinhibited black aggression. This hypothesis too needs to be explored.

On matters other than personal security, my views are largely negative: various policies should be stopped. Public assistance should be ended because it subsidizes high time preferences that could not sustain themselves. Black teen-age girls could not have as many illegitimate children as they do without external support. Public assistance to anyone is suspect on general philosophical grounds, in my view, but ending it now in the U.S. would have the quite specific effect of slowing black population growth. Such a proposal would probably draw the charges of genocide and eugenics, so it is important to be clear that all that is being proposed is the withdrawal of certain benefits (funded coercively by taxation). Refusing to pay someone for having a baby is not killing it, nor is it forcing her not to have children. It is simply refusal to take responsibility for the choice of another to have a child. Of course it might be argued that lower intelligence and foreshortened time perspectives reduce the capacity for reflective choice, so that black teen-age girls do not in the fullest sense freely chose to have illegitimate children. This may be so, and the idea of degrees of free will, correlated with race, is philosophically intriguing (but currently too taboo be he pursued in any philosophical journal). From a practical perspective, however, such distinctions are irrelevant. People have a right not to subsidize undesirable behavior if subsidies reinforce it. Moreover, the behavior of people not fully free is nonetheless susceptible to reinforcement. So it is reasonable to expect the removal of positive reinforcement for illegitimate children in the form of public subsidies will be followed by a decline in the black illegitimate birth rate. Unlike some, however, I do not expect miracles from ending welfare. Welfare reinforces high time preferences and apparently contributes to the depression of mean black IQ, but as it did not create these race differences, terminating it will not reduce black time preferences or raise black intellectual ability

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to white levels. I regard it as wishful thinking to suppose that black entrepreneurship is low because "welfare has sapped it."

Much the same goes for employment. I should like to see the end of affirmative action and indeed all anti-discrimination laws. Freeing employers to hire whomever they please respects rights to free association and maximizes productivity. Once again, however, I think free marketeers are wrong in attributing low black workplace morale entirely to affirmative action indulgence. I do not anticipate the discipline of a free labor market to raise the mean productivity of black workers to white levels. It will remain the case that only 15% of the black population functions at the mean white intelligence level.

Education is a further problem. There is a general perception that the public school systems of the major cities have disintegrated in the past twenty-five years, but reluctance to correlate this change with integration. Even black educators are finding it difficult to deny that an increasing black presence in a classroom increases disorder.[8] Sensing this, whites have fled to suburbs or expensive private schools, which in turn are pressured to "diversify." Once again, my own preference lies in the direction of choice. People should be allowed to send their children wherever they want to, even if this results in unintended resegregation of schools. Indeed, I take the demand for "free choice" in education to be a veiled white demand for permission to avoid blacks. Various voucher plans have been proposed, but every one I have seen stipulates the maintenance of racial balance, so fails to address underlying concerns.

In a certain sense egalitarians show awareness of the problem by urging curricular "diversity" and "multiculturalism,"

---

8. Janice Hale-Benson and Asa Hilliard are quoted in "The Culture Question," *The New York Times Education Supplement*, 1990: pp. 22-25, as insisting that "black children are more restless than white children," and have "high levels of energy, impulsive interrupting and loud talking" which white children do not have. Curiously, the only educational implication these factors are taken to have is the possibility that white teachers "who are not aware that these characteristics seem natural, and not disruptive, to black children sometimes allow this behavior to negatively influence their judgment of a black student's academic ability." There is no suggestion that these race differences in activity levels might adversely affect the learning of white children.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially in schools with large black enrollment. In practice, these reforms amount to substituting the real and imaginary contributions of blacks to American culture, the reading of black authors, and discussions of the ways whites have mistreated blacks, for the more general cognitive skills white children have been expected to master. Egalitarians seem to realize at some level that blacks cannot be expected to reach customary pedagogical goals, and must be taught material more congruent with their abilities. It is unfortunate that this realization is currently translating itself into educational programs which reinforce Negroid resentment against whites.

The plight of egalitarians illustrates the folly of policies propelled by ignorance and guilt. Obviously the best educational policy is to treat each student on the basis of his individual ability, as judged in part by *g*-loaded tests. Such a policy is now impossible because no-one is prepared to accept its results. Ironically, endorsements of "diversity" are never paired with willingness to discuss the precise nature of the racial diversities.

I've discussed a good many social and practical matters, so I will end by suggesting a very "pure" intellectual reason for studying race differences. Everyone who has thought about the subject will acknowledge that the relation of matter to consciousness is a most perplexing problem. A fellow philosopher named Colin McGinn has recently argued that this relation may be incomprehensible to us for two reasons. The first is that we evolved to be good at dealing with physical objects, so we are biased toward noticing those physical features of the brain it shares with non-conscious objects, not those features responsible for consciousness. Second, he argues, we are directly aware of only one kind of consciousness – our own, human consciousness – and so cannot determine how consciousness varies with changes in matter. If McGinn is right, there is not much to be done about the first limitation. But by creating races differing in cognition and time perspectives, evolution may have provided three somewhat different kinds of consciousness capable of communicating with each other. So an honest look at race differences not only exonerates whites of any sense of false guilt, it may help solve the mind-body problem.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCIENCE, RACISM, AND SEXISM

Hans J. Eysenck
Maudsley Hospital, University of London

In 1971, I published a book entitled *Race, Intelligence and Education*;[1] the American title was *The IQ Argument*.[2] This book was written because of the considerable uproar caused by the publication, in 1969, of an invited article by Arthur Jensen in the *Harvard Educational Review*,[3] in which he emphasized the role of genetic factors in intelligence, and mentioned briefly the possibility that black-white differences in IQ (usually around 15 points) might in part be due to genetic causes. In the preface to his book *Genetics and Education*,[4] Jensen has described in detail the persecution he suffered as a result of his scholarly and fully documented article. He and his family received threats that bombs would be planted in their house; he was personally attacked, his lectures broken up, his invited contributions to scientific conferences shouted down, reviewers misrepresented what he had said, lied about the facts, and made him out a racist and a fascist. The police had to post a constant guard at his university office to protect him from attacks. He was unable to continue his research, as educational establishments refused him access to schools and universities. His life was made a total misery, for many, many years.

I wrote my book in order to introduce some sanity into what had become a political, ideological debate. All I did was to collect the relevant facts, and put them together, leaving it to the reader to judge. There clearly was no doubt about the poor performance of blacks on IQ tests; this is universally agreed. What is in dispute is the *cause* of the difference. As I pointed out, there is no direct biological test of possible biological

---

1. Race, Intelligence and Education, Hans J. Eysenck 1971, London: Temple Smith.
2. The IQ Argument, Hans J. Eysenck, New York: Library Press 1971.
3. How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement, Arthur R. Jensen, *Harvard Educational Review* 1969, 39; pp. 1-3.
4. Genetics and Education, Arthur R. Jensen, New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

differentiation; all the evidence must be circumstantial. There were strong reasons to interpret this evidence in genetic terms; but equally it was clear that the evidence was not conclusive. I have recently reviewed the evidence in a chapter on "the effect of race on human abilities and mental test scores", and find that although we now know much more than we did then, the result is pretty much the same. Here I will not discuss the evidence, or raise the question of whether Jensen, or I, or Herrnstein[5] (a Harvard professor, who also got into trouble over his advocacy of genetic determinations of IQ, but who never mentioned race in his work) was right; I shall be concerned rather with the events which resulted from the publication of my book, which, I had hoped rather foolishly, might pour oil on troubled waters!

Perhaps I should have been warned by the fate that befell Arthur Jensen. Perhaps I was optimistic in thinking that England was sufficiently unlike America to make reasonable discussion of fundamental problems possible. Clearly I was naive in thinking that emotional certainty could be touched by scientific evidence and rational argument. When the book appeared the roof fell in. The story is in some ways amusing, but it also has tragic overtones which ought to be taken as a warning.

The Significance of Heredity

In Germany, I had been a member of what we may perhaps call the "Old Left", in contradistinction to the new fascist Left which has come so much to the fore in England and in Europe generally, and the "Old Left" had certain characteristics which may be worth recounting. There was a belief in rational argument, in the power of reason, of persuasion; this was directly opposed to the belief of the (fascist) Right in power, in emotion, and in an irrational group-mind. We had our differences, but we tried to argue them out in cafes, in beer cellars, or on the streets; one could never argue with Hitler's storm-troopers, or

5. See I.W. In the Meritocracy, R.J. Herrnstein. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his S.S. In addition, we were all agreed in a dislike of racialism, in a belief in equality of opportunity, and a hatred of exploitation.

As an academic, I had to teach university courses on intelligence. I had no difficulty in telling my students that there was no evidence for genetic differences in intelligence between racial groups, and that the differences that existed were due entirely to environmental pressures and disadvantages imposed on colored and other groups. This was the orthodox position at that time, and in all truth there was then little evidence to contradict it. However, gradually I came across more and more material that seemed difficult to reconcile with these confident pronouncements. If you matched black and white children in America, with respect to schooling, housing and parental status and income, this hardly reduced the 15-point difference in IQ between the races; it came out at 12 points. Worse, if you took the children of black middle-class parents, coming from good schools and living in good surroundings, and compared them with the children of white working-class children, coming from poor slum schools and living in poor surroundings, still the white children came out better on IQ tests. I did not find facts of this kind easy to integrate with my beliefs in the environmental causation of racial differences in intelligence, and I ceased to lecture on this problem – I did not think it was fair for me to give an opinion when I was in doubt myself.

As the literature grew and grew, so my doubts became more and more definite; I could not in all honesty maintain that environmental pressures could account for all the differences found, and yet my hatred of "racialism" made me most reluctant to entertain the belief that blacks were actually genetically predisposed to lower IQ levels. The publication of Audrey Shuey's great book, *The Testing of Negro Intelligence*,[6] brought my doubts to a focus. She reviewed the whole evidence in the most impartial manner possible, and left the reader with little doubt that genetic factors were probably implicated in the

6. The Testing of Negro Intelligence, A.M. Shuey, New York: Social Science Press 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

observed differences between blacks and whites. I re-read the whole set of articles and books relating to this problem, and emerged with the firm impression that Shuey was right. I also decided that having set my mind at rest, I would not myself publish anything on this problem – the blacks, or so it seemed to me, were having enough problems without me adding another one! But this decision was short lived. The publication of Arthur Jensen's monograph in the *Harvard Educational Review* brought the discussion to the boil, and clearly nothing could put the genie back into the bottle.

"Race, Intelligence and Education"

It now seemed to me that in view of this continuing controversy it might be useful to publish a brief, factual account of the position, intelligible to the non-expert, and explaining in some detail the scientific meaning of such terms as "race", "intelligence", and "heredity" – terms which are used with rare abandon, and little accuracy, by many writers in the press and speakers on television. It seemed desirable to set the record straight, and to state unequivocally that there are two entirely separate problems here.

The first problem is the factual one: what does the evidence say about the causes of the undisputed black inferiority on IQ tests? The second is the ethical one: assuming that genetics play an important part, what shall we do about it? There is no implication of any particular answer to the second problem in the answer to the first. I stated categorically that even if it were true that blacks are innately predisposed to do badly on IQ tests, this does not in any way justify us in treating them on a racial basis, in regarding them as generally inferior, or in discriminating against them in any way, shape or form. It seems to me axiomatic that any person must be judged on what he does rather than on the basis of his race, sex, or religion; the existence of differences between the average scores of groups on IQ or any other quality is scientifically interesting and important, and may suggest better methods of overcoming the difficulties experienced by members of such groups. But it does not abrogate the right of any person to be treated as a person,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than as a representative of a racial or other kind of group. With all of this Arthur Jensen of course agrees. It seemed to me important that it should be said, explicitly and clearly.

In the second place, it seemed important to me that another point should be brought out clearly and explicitly, namely the true nature and extent of the problem in question. Blacks on the whole have low IQs; in fact, as there are almost 10 whites for every black in the U.S.A., the total number of low IQ whites is in fact larger than the total number of low IQ blacks! As I put it rather colorfully in my book, to concentrate on "black dullness" is in reality a red herring – the real social problem is dullness as such, regardless of colour. We have built up a civilization in the West which stresses intelligence, knowledge, literacy, and in which there is less and less room or need for those unable to learn. This produces a gigantic problem which society has done nothing to solve, and which it resolutely refuses to face. What is to be done with all those whose innate limitations condemn them to live through life with an IQ of 85 or below? Colour of the skin may be an additional handicap to some, but the problem is as real for those whose skin is pure white or grey-pink – it is dullness as such that causes the difficulty.

Given these two points, my third reason for writing the book was to suggest that, having recognized the problem, we should proceed to *try* and solve it. Assumptions that it could be solved along traditional lines approved by Left-wing advocates of Better Schools, Smaller Classes, and More Teachers are clearly disproved by the facts, and do not accord with the well-known importance of genetic factors in determining intellectual competence.

Media Bias

When my book was published, comments and reviews began to pour in, and it is these which furnish so intriguing an insight into the process of attitude formation and the molding of opinion. Roughly speaking, reactions can be classified into four main groups. The first (and, unfortunately, the smallest)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consists of accurate, factual reports of the contents, with suitable selection of the most important statements and facts in the book. In fact, of the hundreds of articles I saw, only one falls into this category; not surprisingly, this appeared in *The Times* of London. The author came to see me, asked a number of very pertinent questions in order to make quite sure that he was not misrepresenting my meaning, and then went away and prepared an excellent, truthful, and brief presentation of the main contents of the book. If only all journalism could be carried out at this level! The second category (and perhaps the largest) consists of treatments which trivialize the contents; inevitably this group contains most of the tabloid papers. Typical perhaps is the treatment given the book by the *Daily Mirror*; of all the issues raised, they chose to highlight the fact, mentioned just in passing, and quite irrelevant to the main argument, that the Irish score rather poorly on IQ tests! This caused a number of Irish navvies to ring up and threaten to punch me on the nose, no doubt under the illusion that this was a rational argument which could disprove my factual statement. Several Irish papers took up the point, as did a number of letter-writers; their argument seems to be that there were a large number of famous Irishmen, from G.B. Shaw to President Kennedy – and didn't that show how clever the Irish were? Unfortunately those who argued in this vein had forgotten to read what I actually said – which was that the emigration of many of Ireland's brightest sons left those remaining with a depleted gene pool. The fact that many emigre Irishmen are very bright merely supports my hypothesis.

Much more serious is the treatment given to the book by the third group of papers – they simply ignored it, and failed even to mention its existence. The Germans call this treatment *totgeschwiegen* – killed by silence – and it is a clever and very efficient method of dealing with an awkward problem. This method was adopted almost universally by the American papers. No doubt one can kill a book by keeping the buying public in ignorance of its existence. One wonders if that is the proper function of responsible newspapers, and whether democracy can survive this sort of attitude. This particular act of suppres-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion is, to be sure, unimportant; it is the principle on which book editors seem to have acted which is so frightening. One swallow does not make a summer, but do we really wish to live in a society where illiterate trouble-makers decide which books are or are not to be reviewed in the *New York Times*?

I do not follow the *New York Times Book Review* regularly, but I noted the following description of it by Chandler Brossard in the June 1972 *Harper's Magazine* (p. 110):

> ... Its dazzling lack of credibility is by now part of our national heritage ... A malevolent seediness pervades its pages. Nonetheless, it has enough power in commercial publishing to make or destroy a book, no matter what the real quality of the book may be. Most publishers, consequently, will do any amount of toadying to get *The Times* to be good to their books. They will do nothing, as far as I know, to break *The Times'* clammy hold on their world...

I have left the fourth category to the last; purposely so, because I shall deal with it in some detail. Into this category I put the honest-to-goodness hatchetmen: reporters who go about their job of discrediting both book and author for Sunday paper purposes. There is a difference between such men, journalists without any scientific background to a man, and critics who might disagree with the writer but do so on rational, scientific grounds; it is not the fact that criticism is offered which is relevant, but the manner and the substance of the criticism. I had not realized that such hatchetmen could exist even in such "quality" papers as the *Sunday Times*; my journalistic education had clearly been very deficient. Let me document my statement with some examples from the lengthy treatment my book received in this the largest of the so-called "quality" Sunday papers in Britain.

The best way of proceeding is perhaps by listing a number of "ploys" which the three writers of the *Sunday Times* article used; these ploys are of course not peculiar to them, but occur again and gain in the writings of many others. The first and most remarkable ploy we could call the "Hamlet without the Prince" syndrome. It consists of criticizing the book without ever

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentioning the facts and arguments stated by the writer to be the most important and convincing! I have already mentioned one of these – to wit the fact that even when it is *middle-class blacks* who are being compared with *working-class-whites*, the white children are still ahead on IQ.

The second ploy is that of quoting authority – or perhaps I should say, misquoting authority. This can be done very cleverly, so that even the authority in question might not at first glance see anything wrong. The authors of the article took me to task for stating that there is strong evidence for the dependence of intelligence on genetic factors, to the extent of 80% of variation in intelligence being due to genetic, 20% to environmental factors, a statement based on studies of identical twins brought up in separation from each other, comparisons of identical and fraternal twins, the IQ of adopted children, and many other sources of evidence. They then quoted Professor Donald Hebb as stating "that it is meaningless to ask which, [of] heredity or environment, contributes more to intelligence." Now Hebb never denied the great importance of the genetic contribution to individual differences in intelligence; as I point out in my book, this is the crucial point. The precise allocation of contributions is not important for my argument; hence as far as my argument goes, Hebb and I are in perfect agreement. Thus a proper quotation of "expert opinion" would give quite a different picture to that presented by the unholy *Sunday Times* trio which penned this particular indictment.

The third ploy resembles in its simplicity the first, but gives even more room for inventiveness. It consists of contradicting arguments the original author never made, and disregarding his own assessments of these arguments. The pretence is made throughout that I maintain exactly the opposite of what I actually said, and that the criticisms made by my opponents are in some way novel and destructive of my point of view. This is of course good, unclean fun; it has little to do with impartial criticism and review.

Ploy number four uses time-distortion to give the impression of inaccuracy in my writing. In pointing out that many people do not want to know the truth, I mentioned in my book

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the fact that the American Academy of Sciences had steadfastly refused to support enquiry into the field of genetic black/white differences. My three critics managed to turn this into some form of paranoid delusion by saying that the committee which the Academy set up to consider the matter actually reported: "A majority of the committee has come to feel that the support and encouragement given to this field may be less than the importance of the field justifies..." As it happens my critics actually fell into their own trap; the Academy accepted that part of the committee's report stating that this field was of genuine scientific concern and interest, but refused to actually put up any money.

Ploy number five is perhaps the best of all: it consists of simply attributing to me opinions which are the exact opposite of what I said in my book. The article in the *Sunday Times* stated that I make "an indiscriminate attack on attempts to improve Negro education on the grounds that the subjects may be too stupid to benefit from them." Exactly the opposite is true; I have argued most strongly in favor of discovering better ways of improving Negro education than those which have led to the failure of "Headstart" and other similar programs.

These five ploys ensure that the reader will be unable to see what the writer did in fact say, how what he says agrees with expert opinion, or what consequences follow from it; he will instead be told a number of things the writer never said, and would actually oppose most strongly.

In contrast to these curious outpourings of fancy by three London journalists having no expert knowledge of any of the disciplines involved in the discussion, there is the review of my book, published in the same paper, and written by a very eminent geneticist, Professor C. D. Darlington. Here, one might think, technical criticisms would come thick and fast; no such thing. The expert approved; it was the journalists who did not. Thus we seem to live in a rather topsy-turvy world, where expositions of scientific facts are criticized by journalists as not being factual, while the experts have no such complaints. Trial by journalism has been added to the usual pitfalls of scientific popularization; and it is difficult to gainsay one's impression

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that these journalistic criticisms are provoked more by political than by scientific objections.

What I have described in relation to the *Sunday Times* was recapitulated in so many papers that repetition would become wearying. Let me go on instead to the efforts made by Television to put this debate "in focus." My own *IQ Argument* was one of the *Controversy* series. On the seats reserved for the "opposition" (whose duty presumably it was to oppose) were three well-known geneticists, one psychologist, one sociologist, and one economist who had written on education. The sociologist was as well-known for his Left-wing political opinions as for his sociology; the psychologist was quite unknown to me, and as his only comment seemed to be that he was very interested in things other than the issue in question, his presence remained something of a mystery to me. The economist-educationist again was a Left pundit, with no knowledge of either genetics or psychology.

Actually these recordings are quite complex affairs. I was busy concentrating on my presentation, and was allowed to go on for about eight minutes; then the colored group of students began to interrupt, chant slogans, and shout insults. This brought proceedings to a halt, and I sat down in my chair, curious to see how the chairman would deal with the situation. (The discussion was not transmitted live, so most of the interruption could be – and was – edited out later.) The chairman, a very famous scientist and Nobel Prize winner, asked for silence, and tried to reason with the dissidents; he did not get very far. The students complained that intelligence measurement was all nonsense anyway; suggested it was all a conspiracy to keep blacks down; argued that it was wrong that I, and not they, was afforded the privilege of addressing the audience – in fact, apart from choruses of chants and shouts, they kept at it in this way for about a quarter-of-an-hour. Finally, the B.B.C. producer came to the rescue. He told them that there were six critics who would argue against me anyway; and he finally agreed that two of the audience would be allowed to join the "official" critics and give their opinions later on.

Then it was the turn of the critics. The three geneticists had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their say, and on the whole behaved in a rather academic fashion, making comments which in form and substance could be regarded as reasonable statements. Even they, though, fell into the trap which had been set by the very form of the program. A programme which is entitled *Controversy* suggests that you should controvert, and when you agree with the speaker on 99% of what he has said, then you must make the most you can of the remaining 1% – preferably without mentioning the 99% agreement. This of course gives entirely the wrong impression – look how these "experts" disagree! Strictly speaking what the geneticists said was irrelevant to my talk, in so far as their comments were factually correct; they took up esoteric points from my book, which I had not mentioned in the talk, and made criticisms with which I would often have tended to agree myself. Only one made a really critical comment that was relevant; unfortunately he was wrong on a matter of fact. He suggested that in calculating our 80%/20% ratio of Heredity vs. Environment, Jensen and I had omitted to take into account homogamy, i.e. the tendency of intelligent men to marry intelligent women. Of course we had not made such an elementary mistake, and if he had looked carefully at Jensen's book or mine, he should have seen that this was not so. To their honour let me say that all three critics seemed somewhat unhappy with the whole set-up, and seemed to realize that it put them in a somewhat false position.

The other three behaved in a different manner, leaving academic argument and reason behind, and adopting rather the methods of the hustings. Not for them quiet, peaceful discussion, aimed at understanding and rectification of error, if any – they preferred inflammatory political speeches, to the huge delight of the audience (or at least one part of it). These speeches proved, if such proof were needed, that none of them understood the genetic arguments involved; this did not prevent them from accusing me of presenting "shoddy" experiments, or from stating that the whole problem was "pseudo-scientific."

What was intriguing for me, as a psychologist, was the emotional force behind the speeches. These people were clearly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consumed with anger, giving vent to a passion which seemed quite inappropriate to the occasion. Occasionally, this passion made them quite incoherent. I could only sit and wonder.

Then it was the turn of the two colored students who had been elected to represent the interrupters. What they said was, unfortunately, almost pure nonsense.

Coercion by Radical Students

I have now dealt with the reactions of the newspapers, and with a television debate; let me go on to an account of the reactions of students invited to lectures I gave at the Universities of Birmingham and Leicester.

The theme of the first was the contribution which psychology could make to our political life. Before it started, a group of students distributed a 4-page, single-spaced duplicated leaflet entitled "SEEK TRUTH TO SERVE PEOPLE." The theme was set in the heading: "DENOUNCE FASCIST EYSENCK, INTELLECTUAL PROSTITUTE PROMOTING UNSCIENTIFIC AND ANTI-PEOPLE IDEAS IN THE SERVICE OF IMPERIALISM!" The first paragraph will give a taste of the sweet reasonableness and the academic flavor of this broadsheet:

> In an act of open provocation against the working people and all progressive honest scientists, a fascist and intellectual prostitute, parading as a "professor of psychology", is coming to Birmingham University on the 16 November. The progressive Intellectuals Study Group (Birmingham) condemns the visit of H.J. Eysenck to Birmingham to promote himself and anti-people and unscientific ideas in the service of imperialism.

The broadsheet went on in this style (if that be the right term), producing priceless sentences such as:

> Wildly dreaming that the bourgeoisie will continue sucking the blood of the people forever, Eysenck does propaganda for the practical measures whereby the bourgeoisie can further manipulate the people.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Having thus introduced me to the audience, the writers continue their characterization:

> Eysenck is one of a band of sold-out careerists who are parading as writers, scientists, scholars, etc. They have come forward to prostitute themselves in the service of imperialism. Through the promotion of unscientific and anti-people ideas they are creating the ideological basis for the development of fascism.

Fortunately, help is at hand! Admittedly, "the fascist ideas will not collapse of themselves." But never fear; "they will be smashed if we (1) put Mao Tse-tung thought in command of everything, (2) rely on the people and release their revolutionary initiative." So now we know.

The Birmingham meeting was also the occasion for the militants to produce the oxymoron to end all oxymorons. On the walls of the library building they had written in very large letters: "Uphold genuine academic freedom: Fascist Eysenck has no right to speak." A photograph records this historic occasion: never before or since has my name desecrated the hallowed walls of any University building!

At Leicester I was speaking about "The Inequality of Man." Even though I had to compete with no less a rival attraction than *Led Zeppelin*, the hall was crowded. I was told that the "New Left" groups in Leicester had protested wildly against my being allowed to come and make propaganda for my "racist ideas"; as it happened I did not deal with race at all in my talk. This rather discomfited the large Communist contingent, but at the end their spokesman (or rather woman) managed to get out of this impasse in a truly inimitable fashion.

"I protest," she cried, "against this fascist imperialist Eysenck coming here, and not even having the courage to put before us his racist ideas about the inferiority of colored people!" To do them justice, even the more Left-wing students laughed at this turnabout, and the evening proceeded to its normal conclusion.

Physical Assualt at L.S.E.

But worse was to follow. I was due to give a talk at the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

London School of Economics on the topic of the biological measurement of intelligence, a talk which had no mention of race in it, but concentrated on recent advances in electroencephalography, making possible the recording of brainwaves highly correlated with IQ. What happened is best told in the words of Professor J. Philippe Rushton, then a young student, who attended the meeting:

> On the morning of the occurrence I arrived at the School around 9 a.m. Already the demonstrators were there. As I walked along Houghton Street and into the St. Clements Building (where the Psychology Department was housed), I was greeted by an angry chorus of "No Free Speech for Fascists", and mimeographed sheets were thrust into my hands. The demonstrators had lined up in front of the opening doors and were chanting the "No Free Speech..." slogan in unison whenever anybody entered the building. The mimeographed sheets alleged that Eysenck was a fascist who claimed that the working class and ethnic minorities in Britain deserved an inferior status because they had genetically-based lower IQs. It was clear that either they had never read Eysenck, or else were determined to totally misrepresent him.
>
> Finally Eysenck, accompanied by several representatives of student organizations, appeared through a door at the front of the hall. A great wall of booing arose immediately, and I had my first experience of the intensity of the anger and hostility that there was in that room. What followed resembled a circus. First a member of the Students' Union took the podium and *apologized* to the assembled audience for Eysenck's presence on campus. (Eysenck, at this time, was sitting in a nearby chair looking quite calm, with an air of studied patience.) The speaker vigorously attempted to dissociate himself and the Students' Union from the invitation to Eysenck to visit the campus. Apparently another student organization had issued the invitation, and it had not been cleared by the main L.S.E. Students' Union. The Students' Union Representative continued talking for several minutes. After denouncing Eysenck he then described his *own* political views, and how they differed so greatly from Eysenck's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After some 10 minutes the speaker asked the assembled audience if they would prefer him to cancel the talk and deny Eysenck the right to speak (which was apparently within his power) or would they prefer him to allow Eysenck to speak? Bedlam broke out as the radicals chanted in unison "No Free Speech for Fascists." After almost 10 minutes of this, a vote was finally taken with the overwhelming majority of the audience voting to hear Eysenck speak. Individual radicals, however, continued in their attempts to disrupt the proceedings ... The Students' Union representative then decided to take yet another vote as to whether Eysenck should be allowed to speak. This time a clear 80% or more people voted affirmatively. It required the passage of even more time and yet another vote however before the Students' Union Representative relinquished the podium ... All during this time, perhaps 30 minutes since entering the room, Eysenck had sat apparently quite undisturbed by the goings-on. Now he stood up and approached the long table on which rested the podium and microphone, and which separated him by about four feet from the front row of angry Maoists. Eysenck placed his hands slowly on either side of the podium, a gentle, perhaps even ironic smile on his lips, and said softly, "Well, I hope I'm not going to say anything too controversial..."

That was as far as he got. Suddenly, a female, aged about 20, leapt up from the front row, ran past the podium, and pulled the microphone onto the floor. The auditorium exploded into an uproar. From my perspective in the eighth row it appeared as if the entire front row of eight or ten people suddenly dived across the table separating them from Eysenck. The podium came crashing down, and a scuffle immediately started. One demonstrator appeared to be wildly throwing punches at Eysenck who in turn appeared to be blocking them with his arms and covering his face. Few people went to his aid. Those at the front seemed immobilized. Those around me became irrational – either swearing at nobody in particular or laughing nervously ... Then I saw Eysenck being hustled away out of the door. Somebody said that there was blood streaming down his face, from a cut eye because his glasses had been broken. Personally I felt outraged. It is difficult to remember another time, previous or subsequent, that I felt quite so much anger and shock. It was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> as though the veneer of civilization had been ripped away, revealing not only the raw naked passion beneath, but also just how delicate and fragile that veneer could be.[7]

A year or two later I encountered similar difficulties in Australia. Jensen and I had been invited by the University of Melbourne to give some talks on "Intelligence" (Jensen) and "Personality" (myself) as "Factors in Education." Some 150 police, many on horseback, were drafted in to protect us against a threatening mob, many of whom succeeded in getting into the lecture theater through forged tickets; they set up an endless howling of "Sieg Heils," and effectively disrupted the proceedings. In Sydney things were even worse. A fairly peaceful crowd barred my way into the University; when TV crews arrived and began filming, the crowd became much more violent and vituperative. When I finally got to the lecture theater, a touching tableau had been arranged of a "slave" led on a rope by his "master," no doubt intending to suggest that I was in favor of slavery! Bags of flour were thrown, one of which unfortunately hit the professor of psychology there, an unintended victim who suffered in my stead.

In the evening I was invited to give a talk on the history of behavior therapy – an innocent enough exercise, one would have thought, but not a bit of it! A threatening crowd of several hundred young students were gathered outside the main gates, which had been closed, and were guarded by some stout rugger-type defenders. As I started my talk, we could all hear the noise and the shouting; this was followed by the beating-up of the guardians, and finally the breaking down of the doors. At this point the chairman suggested abandoning the talk, and I was led up to the roof, and across it to another building, then down the stairs to a get-away car, with the yobs close behind, howling like wolves. This was as near to a Bond film as I ever got; it was quite romantic, but the thrills became rather less attractive as the danger approached more closely!

---

7. *Education and Ethnicity: The U.S. Experiment in School Integration*, Ralph Scott, Washington D.C.: Council for Social and Economic Studies 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Family Harassment

What upset me more than anything, much more than these personal attacks on me, was the fact that my children were made to suffer by their teachers, whose left-wing views led them to vent their outrage at my (alleged) views on the innocent. Whenever my name got into the papers, they would make pointed remarks in class, putting my children in an impossible position. Things got so bad that I changed my name by deed poll to Evans; this afforded the children some protection, particularly later on when they went to university. When things quieted down I changed it back to Eysenck, but only Michael and Connie followed me in this move. Sybil of course was fully consulted at each step, and agreed with the course I took.

One interesting example of the absurdity of the persecution I suffered was related to me by Connie, who was reading English at the University of Sussex. In the course of her studies she had to take same courses in psychology, and to her astonishment heard the lecturer tell the class about the wicked experiments that devil Eysenck had carried out on his only daughter! Apparently I had put her in a large box, shortly after birth, in order to see how a child would grow up without interacting with her family. He added that the poor child grew up a complete nervous wreck! This rather surprised my daughter, who is as far removed from neuroticism as it is humanly possible to be! The poor loon had mixed me up with B.F. Skinner who had carried out some such experiment on one of his daughters. (I actually met the lady in question, and can testify that she is perfectly normal, happily married, and showing no evil after-effects!) This delicious, ignorant type of tittle-tattle, masquerading as factual teaching, is pretty representative of the left-wing nonsense spouted by all-too-many militant lecturers and professors of what was laughingly called "social science" at the time!

Enough of these personal reminiscences. What sort of a general conclusion can one draw from these odd and variegated facts, and why do I feel that their impact is tragic? Perhaps I may put my standpoint in this way: We are faced with an unprecedented series of problems, each of gigantic and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potentially disastrous proportions. Pollution is one; over-population is another; racial strife is a third. We clearly do not know how to deal with these problems; not only do we not know the right answers, we hardly know what proper questions to ask. In such a perilous situation, it behooves us to heed Sir Francis Bacon's wise words: "If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubt; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties..."

Need for Scientific Facts

Looking at the racial problem, we should begin with self-questioning doubt – can we observe any important and relevant differences between races? Can we attribute these to genetic or environmental causes? Can we do anything about reducing or abolishing them? No one knows for sure, and our best way is obviously that of critical and cautious experimentation. My book constituted an attempt to survey what was factually known about such problems, and to suggest what conclusions, if any, could be drawn from the facts. I also attempted to suggest further experiments which might throw light on these intricate and difficult problems. My feeble efforts were greeted with scorn by those who already knew the answers – of course there are no races, of course blacks are as bright as whites, of course any putative differences are due to environmental factors. And, of course, anyone who dares to doubt these truths must be a fascist, seduced by the establishment into utter intellectual prostitution. No attempt here to argue the case, or to deal with the facts – this would be "bourgeois objectivity" which Stalin already condemned as counter-revolutionary. And, to be sure, if we *know* the truth – presumably through Marxological revelation – then the end justifies the means: burn books, boycott publishers and book-sellers, break up meetings, threaten and persecute those who dare disagree with you. Force, not reason, becomes the measuring rod of truth.

In my view, it bodes evil for our society that these attitudes should be found among students, i.e. among those who have been selected specially for their intellectual ability, and who have been trained (or should have been trained) in the use of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reason. If the best that such people can do, in reply to the facts I had gathered and the arguments I had put forward, is to call the book "racist" and to advocate that all would be well if only we "put Mao Tse-tung thought in command of everything," then God help us! One does not expect everyone to agree with one, but one does expect from University students that they should read a book carefully before condemning it. Equally the task of newspapers, particularly so-called "quality newspapers," is surely to put before their readers reliable information concerning recent developments in research. What is it but an abdication of responsibility to retire into silence, for fear of trouble (like the *New York Times*) or to misrepresent completely the arguments advanced (like the *Sunday Times*)?

The rot has set in, and it has done so more insidiously than is generally realized. In the face of campaigns of violence, hatred and persecution many scholars have begun to mind their p's and q's, and dot their i's and cross their t's; that is to say, withdraw from acknowledging their real views and opinions publicly. Both Arthur Jensen and I have talked to eminent geneticists and psychologists who – in private – agreed with our views, but refused to be quoted publicly, for fear of repercussions. Worse than that. Some have in public said things which in private they would repudiate, and did in fact repudiate. Thus Jensen and I have stated that the contribution of heredity to IQ differences is about 80%; a geneticist could easily stand up in public, to general applause, and say he did not agree with that figure, and doubted that it was meaningful. When you talk to him in private, you discover that all he means is that no such precise figure as "80%" can be given. Thus complete agreement is apparently turned into violent disagreement, which is then widely publicized by those who oppose all scientific investigation of these problems. In science it is always possible to argue that "Not enough is known to come to any definite conclusion." Such phrases, rolling trippingly off the tongue, will not only get you off the hook, but will also mark you as a careful, conscientious scholar. On these grounds you might just as well say that the evidence is not yet completely conclusive about the heliocentric theory of Copernicus, and that you are prudently reserving

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

judgement.

But what good can the publication of such books as *The IQ Argument* do? Many well-meaning people, far removed from the iconoclastic Left, have asked me this question. The answer is very simple. We wish to help the various disadvantaged groups, be they blacks, poor whites, Red Indians, or whomever. The problem is to know just how this can best be done, and the answer to this question is not obvious, but demands knowledge. "Head-Start" and other programs were put into effect because many sociologists and educationists thought that through these means the scholastic achievement, and even the IQ, of deprived children could be raised. We now know that this hope was doomed to disappointment. Action not based on knowledge is futile, and may well be counter-productive. This is not to say that we should do *nothing*. It is simply to argue that we must first do our homework before we plunge in and spend untold millions. Research must come before action; commonsense, unfortunately, does not have all the solutions.

This, then, is the *trahison des clercs* of which I make complaint: that both students and their elders and betters have begun to play a child's game of goodies and baddies, in which a man's work is judged, not in terms of its scientific content, or on any rational, empirical basis, but in terms of whether it agrees with the critic's preconceptions.

And my suggestion for the future is that which Sir Francis Bacon gave centuries ago in *The Advancement of Learning*:

> To have the true testimonies of learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit objection, I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces it hath received, all from ignorance; but ignorance severally disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines; sometimes in the severity and arrogance of politiques; and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves...

A Resolution for Scientific Freedom

However that may be, there are of course difficult ethical and moral problems and dilemmas involved in the discussion,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the exhortations of militant Leftists should not preclude serious discussion of these problems. Note first of all a "Resolution in Scientific Freedom", signed by 50 eminent scientists, among them: Francis H.C. Crick, Nobel Prize-winner, Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Cambridge University; Jacques Monod, Nobel Prize-winner, Institut Pasteur, Collège de France; Arthur R. Jensen, Professor of Educational Psychology, University of California; Richard Herrnstein, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University; C.D. Darlington, Professor of Botany, Oxford University; and John C. Kendrew, Nobel Prize-winner, Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Cambridge University. The Resolution reads as follows:

> The history of civilization shows many periods when scientific research or teaching was censured, punished, or suppressed for non-scientific reasons, usually for seeming to contradict some religious or political belief. Well-known scientist victims include: Galileo in orthodox Italy; Darwin, in Victorian England; Einstein, in Hitler's Germany; and Mendelian biologists, in Stalin's Russia.
>
> Today, a similar suppression, censure, punishment, and defamation are being applied against scientists who emphasize the role of heredity in human behavior. Published positions are often misquoted and misrepresented; emotional appeals replace scientific reasoning; arguments are directed against the man rather than against the evidence (e.g. a scientist is called "fascist", and his arguments are ignored).
>
> A large number of attacks come from non-scientists, or even anti-scientists, among the political militants on campus. Other attackers include academics committed to environmentalism in their explanation of almost all human differences. And a large number of scientists, who have studied the evidence and are persuaded of the great role played by heredity in human behavior, are silent, neither expressing their beliefs clearly in public, nor rallying strongly to the defence of their more outspoken colleagues.
>
> The results are seen in the present academy; it is virtually heresy to express a hereditarian view, or to recommend further study of the biological bases of behavior. A kind of orthodox environmentalism dominates the liberal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

academy, and strongly inhibits teachers, researchers, and scholars from turning to biological explanations or efforts. Now, therefore, we the undersigned scientists from a variety of fields, declare the following beliefs and principles:

(1) We have investigated much evidence concerning the possible role of inheritance in human abilities and behaviours, and *we believe such hereditary influences* are very strong.
(2) We wish strongly to encourage research into the biological and hereditary bases of behavior, as a major complement to the environmental efforts at explanation.
(3) We strongly defend the right, and emphasize the scholarly duty, of the teacher to discuss hereditary influences on behavior, in appropriate settings and with responsible scholarship.
(4) We deplore the evasion of hereditary reasoning in current textbooks, and the failure to give responsible weight to heredity in disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, social anthropology, educational psychology, psychological measurement, and many others.
(5) We call upon liberal academics – upon faculty senates, upon professional and learned societies, upon the American Association of University Professors, upon the American Civil Liberties Union, upon the University Centres for Rational Alternatives, upon presidents and boards of trustees, upon departments of science, and upon the editors of scholarly journals – to insist upon the openness of social science to the well-grounded claims of the bio-behavioral reasoning, and to protect vigilantly any qualified faculty members who responsibly teach, research, or publish concerning such reasoning.

We so urge because as scientists we believe that human problems may best be remedied by increased human knowledge, and that such increases in knowledge lead much more probably to the enhancement of human happiness, than to the opposite.

The Duty of a Scientist

I was asked by the British Association for the Advancement of Science to contribute an article on the ethics of science and the duties of scientists, with special reference to these events. What I wrote then I still believe to be right, and consequently

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the body of the text of my contribution is reprinted here in full. This is what I said:

> It used to be taken for granted that it was not only ethically *right* for scientists to make public their discoveries; it was regarded as their *duty* to do so. Secrecy, the withholding of information, and the refusal to communicate knowledge were rightly regarded as cardinal sins against the scientific ethos. This is true no more. In recent years it has been argued, more and more vociferously, that scientists should have regard for the social consequences of their discoveries, and of their pronouncements; if these consequences are undesirable, the research in the area involved should be terminated, and results already achieved should not be publicized. The area which has seen most of this kind of argumentation is of course that concerned with the inheritance of intelligence, and with racial differences in ability; many even of those who acknowledge that Jensen's arguments are scientifically correct have argued that he was wrong (and that Herrnstein and I were wrong) in actually publishing the conclusions to which all the experimental work was leading. Stressing the possible hereditary nature of the IQ deficit of American blacks, as compared with American whites, might have serious consequences in jeopardizing the integration between the races ... better let sleeping dogs lie and studiously turn a blind eye to such facts and theories as might impinge on the general belief in universal egalitarianism, and threaten its very foundations.

I believe that there are powerful arguments against this modern belief in the opportunist silencing of inconvenient theories, and the refusal to support research which might unearth equally inconvenient facts, all in the supposed interests of society. The first argument by itself, I would suggest, is quite conclusive; it is based on the impossibility of forecasting the social consequences (or even the scientific consequences) of one's findings and theories. It is impossible to read the history of science without becoming aware of the fact that even the greatest scientists were incapable of looking ahead even a few years and predicting the consequences of their actions. Both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rutherford and Einstein are quoted, only some 20 years before the manufacture of the first atomic bomb, as being convinced that it would be forever impossible to harness the forces of the atom either to useful work or to destruction. Both were quite certain of this, and both dismissed contrary views as "nonsense". In other words, the foremost experimentalist and the foremost theoretician in this field of science, both men of genius and stature who towered above the other brilliant workers in this area, were unable to look ahead even a short time and assess correctly the scientific consequences of their own experiments and theories!

The Dangers of Censorship

What is often meant, of course, is something quite different, and I only mention this alternative to dismiss it without discussion. What many people mean when they require others to keep silent about their discoveries is simply that they, the potential censors, are convinced that these findings will have effects which they, again the censors, feel would be against the interests of society as they, the censors, see these. Usually the censors base themselves on some political ideology which has no scientific basis but acts rather like a religious dogma. I would argue that self-censorship is bad, and against the best interests of scientific and social advancement; nevertheless, each person must decide for himself where his major allegiance lies, and neither I nor anyone else has a right to interfere. But the situation is quite different once we enter the public domain. For A to silence B because A feels that possibly B's findings and theories might affect society in a way which is contrary to A's social and political susceptibilities is intolerable in a free society, quite apart from the obvious fact that A's powers to predict the actual consequences of B's discoveries are unlikely to be superior to those of B – which, in turn, as we have seen, are pretty poor in the first place.

Having got this general statement of principle out of the way, I would like to take the opportunity to illustrate two further objections to the restrictionist view by reference to the Jensen debate. The first point is that being a member of a given

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

race has certain social consequences regardless of the scientific study of racial intelligence, but that a proper understanding of these consequences can only be gained by proper scientific study. Thus opponents of the Jensen point of view discovered long before he published his findings that there was a proportional deficit of blacks in American universities, and a proportional over-representation of this group in educationally subnormal classes. The fact of disproportional representation is undisputed; its interpretation is. To many egalitarians, the explanation lies in discrimination; blacks are equally able as whites, but they are discriminated against. The answer is some form of quota system (widely used in the U.S.A. under the euphemistic title of "affirmative action"). To the followers of Jensen, the explanation lies in hereditary differences in IQ (at least in part; they do not question the existence of discrimination in the past, or the existence of reverse discrimination at present.) They would predict that the quota system would have disastrous consequences, being based on an erroneous theory. Thus clearly the theories in question are not of purely academic interest. They determine social action, and these actions may have far-reaching consequences. It seems a curious interpretation of ethical responsibility to ask one side to the controversy, namely, the side which has made a scientific study of the problem, and which can quote facts and figures to support its case, to keep silent and see injustice done.

The outcome of this general quota system has not been documented very extensively, but certain features are already very apparent. Black students are accepted on the basis of much lower entrance requirements than white students; they have a catastrophically high failure rate; and they tend to congregate in separate groups which defy any integration with white students. The high failure rate has led to two interesting developments. Either black students are concentrated on new non-academic courses of the "black studies" type, or else examinations are specially marked for them on a much lower level. In same schools, the quota system has been extended to E.S.N. and advanced classes, so the many E.S.N. black children mix with other children in classes which they are completely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unable to follow; conversely, average-intelligence black children are promoted into advanced classes where they are simply lost. As a result, children thus forced into inappropriate scholastic streams drop even further behind, lose interest completely, and run riot, making education for all children impossible. The result, in one well-known case, has been a demand by black parents for segregation, and the creation of a purely black sub-unit within the school! Clearly, it is at least arguable whether the theories of the opponents of Jensen have such socially desirable consequences that they justify silencing opponents. I believe that very important consequences have followed from the attempts to silence him, and that these consequences are serious, and should be reviewed very carefully, quite regardless of whether his contentions are right or wrong.

The first consequence, of course, is that students are now unable to judge the arguments for and against on their merits; they are thus losing what may be the most important part of their training, namely the habit and ability to form such judgements independently.

Students thus never get to hear our arguments. Worse, they never get to hear the opposing arguments. Worst of all, they have no opportunity to ask questions, or form judgements, as is surely their right. Thus their intellectual development is stultified, and they became subject to mob psychology, to unthinking allegiances, and to ideological subornation. Furthermore, they became used to seeing violence as the proper answer to unpleasant arguments, and censorship as a suitable reply to disagreeable facts.

The second consequence is on freedom of communication. At least, it will be said, unpopular arguments can be disseminated in printed form, even if they cannot be discussed in person. This, I am afraid, is a fond illusion too. When my book on *The I.Q. Argument* appeared in the U.S.A., the S.D.S. (oddly named "Students for a Democratic Society") threatened wholesalers and retailers with arson and violence if they stocked or sold it, and as a consequence it was practically impossible to obtain the book in the U.S.A. Newspapers refused to review it,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so many potentially interested readers never heard of it. One famous professor of biology had his classes disrupted because, as editor of a scientific journal, he allowed the book to be reviewed by someone else! Newspapers tore the argument to pieces, hopelessly misrepresenting it in the process; thus most people base their views on an entirely false idea of what Jensen and I are actually saying and suggesting. This list is endless, but what has been said so far will make it clear that freedom of communication, in any real sense of the word, does not exist any longer for scientific facts which run counter to the *Zeitgeist*.

The third consequence is a marked deterioration of the quality of scientific work done in the area concerned. When the acceptability of an experimental result depends, not on the quality of the work, the rigor of the design, or the excellence of the analysis, but rather on the outcome and its acceptability to ideologically motivated students, then clearly Gresham's Law will be translated into science, and bad science will drive out good. This is already only too apparent; there is an endless string of articles being published of research which would never have passed the referees twenty years ago, and which are so shot through with faults of design, of execution, and of analysis that it is only the fact that the results are in the environmentalistic, egalitarian direction that ensures their publication.

A fourth consequence is the deterioration of moral fibre of people working in such "socially important" areas. According to the scientific ethos, scientists should fearlessly speak the truth; in theory, truth is the supreme god to whom the scientist bows. The position now is departing rather rapidly from this simple belief. Both Jensen and I have received many letters from well-known biologists, psychologists and geneticists, congratulating us on our work, but adding; "Please don't quote me!"

As the astronomer, Carl Sagan, has pointed out: "In a time of trouble, the tendency of society is to constrict the range of accepted ideas. But just the opposite – diversity, heresy – is what is needed if problems are to be solved." This is well said, and it is the true answer to those who wish to constrain and confine the free communication of scientific results and theories in the putative cause of "social concern."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Society needs social concern and ethical involvement; it also needs facts, and the fearless advocacy of the truth. In these days, perhaps it needs the latter as much as the former. Personally, I would take my stand with Thomas Jefferson:

> There is no truth existing which I fear, or would wish unknown to the whole world.

Even when people agree with all these points, there still often remains a nagging feeling that all this scratching of the pustules on the skin of society has no real purpose, and that it does not contribute to the discovery of remedial action for all those ills related to racism and racial differences. This is not true, as a few examples will illustrate.

It is often suggested that the poor educational achievement of black children is due in a large measure to racial prejudice; the important IQ differences of these children, as compared with white children, are usually not even mentioned, although IQ is by far the best predictor of school success. But is this allegation true? In Great Britain, children of Indian and Pakistani parents suffer an equal or even greater degree of racial prejudice, as compared with children of West Indian parentage; yet they are equal or even slightly superior in school achievement as compared with white children. Thus clearly prejudice is not the causal factor in producing the disappointing examination results of black children. Similarly, in the U.S.A., there was much greater racial prejudice against the children of Japanese than of black parents, particularly at the time of Pearl Harbor; yet these Japanese children significantly outperformed native white children! Remembering the special language deficits of Japanese, Indian and Pakistani children, this is truly amazing, but it does closely correspond with the respective IQs of these groups. Thus IQ is much more predictive of school achievement than racial prejudice, and this fact surely has important repercussions as far as helping black children to achieve better results is concerned. Instead of worrying, as many local councils do, about appointing special racial advisers to schools, it would be more helpful to research methods of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

teaching more applicable to children of low IQ – whether black, yellow or white! Jensen has made important suggestions in this connection, based on fundamental research into learning paradigms, and these may lead to more useful educational advances than the empty rhetoric of "racial prejudice" to explain everything.

The evil consequences of ignoring scientific facts, and believing instead ideological preconceptions, are well illustrated by the American "busing laws," enforcing racial integration by busing white children to predominantly black schools, often many miles away, and equally, busing black children to predominantly white schools. These laws, spawned by unscientific thinking and wilful ignorance, have had predictable effects, which have been carefully researched by Ralph Scott, whose book *Education and Ethnicity: The U.S. Experiment in School Integration*[8] summarizes the many studies which have been done on this topic. He presents his conclusions as follows:

> It is perplexing that circumstances have worsened for literally millions of minority youths during a period which has witnessed the burgeoning of special programes designed to help them. For more than three decades the entire structure of U.S. education has been dramatically reshaped so that race-conscious educational provisions might be implemented. Forced busing ordered by courts to bring about a racial "balance" in the classroom, not only brought about the virtual demise of the neighborhood school, but marked the first step in a process which has diverted schools from their historical emphasis on education to a new emphasis upon social engineering.
>
> As U.S. schools became racially "balanced", educators are forced to deal with large ethnic achievement gaps at the high school level: the average of reading and math scores for white students, for example, exceeds the average for blacks by as much as three grade levels. School desegregation has not reduced the magnitude of that gap. Within classrooms,

8. *Education and Ethnicity: The U.S. Experiment in School Integration*, Ralph Scott, Washington D.C.: Council for Social and Economic Studies 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the range of student abilities expanded as large numbers of blacks were bused to middle class schools. It is not unknown, for example, for a tenth grade student to have trouble reading a third grade textbook while sitting beside classmates capable of college work.

Recognizing that teachers cannot effectively deal with the wide achievement spread within classrooms, which appeared after busing, school administrators frequently employed a practice known as ability grouping. This permitted teachers to bring educational materials and assignments more in line with the abilities of individual students. But critics faulted ability grouping as 'resegregation', and this charge was supported in the sense that disproportionately large numbers of blacks were placed on the lower tracks. Educators responded with political expediency: typically, ability grouping was abolished, and classroom and instructional groupings were racially balanced. Other race-conscious intervention measures followed: informal quotas on student discipline, on grading practices and promotions, on participation in extra-curricular activities, and in composition of special classrooms such as those for the gifted and mentally retarded.

A causal relationship exists between race-sensitive schooling policies and the worsening plight of many blacks. The destruction of neighborhood schools has weakened the essential bonds of home, school and community. The near demise of ability grouping has caused an inordinate number of blacks to unnecessarily fail to gain skills requisite for later employment. Ethnic quotas on discipline and suspensions have forced teachers to tolerate behavior which is most efficaciously curbed during the formative years. Unrealistic grading policies have led a large fraction of students to inflate their self-esteem and to consider disdainful those unskilled jobs which might offer opportunities for later gainful employment and enhanced self-respect. Racial quotas for exceptional students have so altered what is meant by the terms 'mentally retarded', 'gifted' and 'learning disabled' that such special classes have lost their original meanings. Uncritical promotions, ignoring students' actual academic competencies, have led to unacceptably high failure rates in high school and universities, and, in some cases, to the certification of unqualified professionals as verified by the high failure rates of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> blacks on teacher competency tests, which has inspired negative stigma. However well-intentioned, race-conscious schooling practices have therefore directly contributed to the 'nightmarish' problems of blacks.

In other words, here as elsewhere, programs designed to help the underprivileged have actually had the opposite effect, because of the neglect of available scientific evidence. These disasters could so easily have been avoided had those who initiated the social programs had the commonsense to look at the evidence. A good heart is not enough when it comes to designing effective social action to help blacks, or women, or any other group that may be having difficulties; a good head, free from ideological preconceptions, is also required if the action taken is not to have effects directly counter to the intentions of its author. It is for this reason that research into racial differences is needed – no research, no facts; no facts, no successful action.

Rereading all that I have said here, I feel again the sadness that the whole controversy has inspired in me. My values, my intentions, my motivation are at one with all those who have attacked and calumnified me; we all want to correct racial prejudice, help the underprivileged, seek greater social equality, make this a better world to live in. Thus we are agreed on the ends, but we disagree on the means. My view is that science and factual knowledge must play a part in deciding what is feasible, what not; what is likely to be helpful, what not; what furthers our agreed ends, what not. These facts may be disagreeable, but they will not go away. They constrain what can be achieved; they dictate the methods to be used; they often contradict deeply felt beliefs and attitudes. Life would be so much easier if only things were different, but they are as they are. Successful action can only be built upon secure knowledge. It is the task of science to provide such knowledge. To seek to prevent this process, or to take action on the basis of ideological preconceptions, is to betray the very ideals which decide our ends. This must be the justification of continued research in this field; only in this way can we avoid harming those we seek to help, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work out methods which will successfully aid those must in need of such aid.

What I have said so far about race applies in equal measure to sex. I have always been a feminist, in the sense given to the concept by John Stuart Mill; I strongly believe that women have been discriminated against very badly, and have a very hard time in a man's world. I approve of laws attempting to redress the balance, and applaud all efforts to enforce equal pay for equal work. But my belief in equality of status does not include belief in biological equality; the evidence strongly suggests that men and women are profoundly different biologically, and that while role-playing and other social factors enhance this difference, they do not cause it in the first place. I wrote a book on this theme with Glenn Wilson, entitled *The Psychology of Sex*,[9] which sets out in detail the evidence for this belief. The evidence is partly biological, partly social.

On the biological side, it is evident that when females (human or other primates) receive, accidentally or by design, too strong a dose of androgens (male sex hormones) during the last two months of foetal life, they grow up showing behavior typically *male* in nature, and quite different from the control females not receiving the androgens. Such masculinized girls are very tomboyish, prefer to play with boys already at an early age, like rough-and-tumble games, dislike chic, pretty or fashionably feminine clothing, but prefer theirs to be utilitarian or functional. They show little interest in accessories like jewelry, perfume and hairstyling. There is an indifference to dolls, and a preference for cars, trucks and guns. Later on there is a lack of interest in infants; they do not enjoy doing things for the care of babies and do not anticipate doing such things, even as paid babysitters in the future.

Many of the androgenized girls stated they would rather not have children; they preferred careers to marriage, while the controls regarded marriage as the most important thing in their future. *Mutatis mutandis*, similar differences have been found in

9. *The Psychology of Sex*, H.J. Eysenck and Glenn Wilson. London: J.M Dent, 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

female donkeys as the result of androgen injection. Male behavior, socially and sexually, does seem causally linked with early hormone levels prior to birth.

On the social side, the best evidence comes from Israeli *Kibbutzim*, i.e. children who were brought up in an environment which stressed sexual equality, played down the influence of the family, and provided role models emphasizing equality of work. In spite of this high degree of brain-washing, the children reverted to type, almost exaggeratedly so; girls played with dolls, boys with trucks and guns; girls went for adornment, quite against all the social pressures to which they had been exposed; finally, boys and girls opted for a traditional family life, as against the communal living preached and practiced by their parents. Altogether, when social precept opposed biological promptings, social precept lost out all along the way. This is an important social experiment, replicated many times, that we disregard at our peril.

The tragedy of course is that many of the women who started out as outspoken proponents of the Kibbutz ideology regretted later all the things they had given up. Others would regret bitterly not having lived a complete family life, and enjoyed adornment, romantic love and role fulfillment. The children were too wise to make this renunciation; biology proved a better teacher than society!

Again, as in the case of race, we are talking about averages; there is much overlap, and many exceptions. What I want to emphasize, however, is that much harm can be done by trying to persuade women that they are *identical* (except for the *petite difference*!) with males, and should adopt male values, behaviours and characteristics. When girls accept such teaching, they may wake up too late to find their best chances of happiness gone. Each one of us should have the chance to choose his or her destiny without pressure to adhere to some ideal chosen for him or her on the basis of some quite unscientific and arbitrary ideology. Thus I would reject ideological feminism, based on ignorance of biological reality; equal but different is the verdict of nature, and we depart from it at our peril.

Just as my book on race earned me the epithet of "racist",

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so our book on sex earned Wilson and me the epithet "sexist". When Wilson showed the manuscript of our book to an American publisher, he was excited and keen to publish it. However, his reader warned him that the book would be regarded as "sexist" by females on campus, and boycotted by them; she advised rejection. Americans have been effectively protected against the truth ever since; the book never found an American publisher! So much for freedom of speech, and the First Amendment. There are shibboleths in our society which it is dangerous to disregard; ideology is stronger, if only in the short run, than science, and facts which do not fit in with ideology are censored and cast out into the void. Fortunately a less strident tone is becoming noticeable in regard to both race and sex; perhaps in a few years' time, it may be possible to discuss and research these topics seriously without being attacked physically, having one's writings censored, and being labelled "racist" or "sexist" for pointing out indisputable facts. Perhaps.

REFERENCES

Eysenck, H.J.

1971 *Race, Intelligence and Education*. London: Temple Smith.

1984 The effect of race on human abilities and mental test scores. In: C.R. Reynolds and R.T. Brown (Eds.), *Perspectives on Bias: Mental Testing*. New York: Plenum Press. Pp. 249-292.

1990 *Rebel with a Cause*. London: W. H. Allen.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RACE, INTELLIGENCE AND BIAS IN ACADEME
By Roger Pearson
Introduction by Hans J. Eysenck
Scott-Townsend Publishers, P.O. Box 34070
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20043
304 pages $25.00

This detailed work comprehensively reviews the virulent opposition in academe and the media to suppress genetic explanations for differences in human behavior with particular regard to the nature/nurture argument concerning intelligence. The author, a former professor of anthropology and university dean, is well acquainted with the inner workings of academe in U.S. universities, both with regard to faculty and administrative orientation, and is the author of several textbooks on the social sciences. He is currently director of the Council for Social and Economic Studies and managing editor of *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*.

The 304 page volume opens with a dynamic introduction by Professor Hans J. Eysenck of the University of London Institute of Psychiatry on the subject of "Science and Racism." A substantial manuscript by the world's most frequently cited psychologist, this introduction details Eysenck's own harsh experiences at the hands of radical students, faculty and media, and sets the tone for the many chapters that follow. Eysenck's keen intellect and methodical approach to unravelling the links between genetics and human behavior makes his contribution an ideal introduction to Pearson's remarkable study.

Eysenck records how he was physically assaulted by Leftist students when he sought to deliver a lecture at the London School of Economics, his glasses being broken as the demonstrators rained punches on him. Eysenck's unpopularity peaked within the Leftist/Marxist community when he asserted that approximately 80% of IQ is determined by heredity. Because he openly stated that intelligence was predominantly determined

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by heredity, and that it varied between races, and because he maintained that no scientific data of any kind should be withheld from either the academic community or the public, he has been persistently slandered as a "racist," a "fascist" and a "nazi" – even though his parents brought him to Britain as a refugee from Germany in the 1930's.

Pearson's main text then begins by tracing the history and development of "behavioral genetics" from Darwin, Sir Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, through the rise of the eugenics movement and its eventual demise in Britain and America due to often subtle but constantly aggressive pressure from the Left. The author then explains how Marxist-Leninist thinkers were obliged to suppress evidence of the inheritance of intellectual qualities in order to preserve the theory of class exploitation on which their philosophy was based. For this purpose, they adopted the fallacious concepts of Lysenkoism, whose twisted theories seeped into the teaching of Western social sciences by way of Marxist propaganda.

Leftist academicians and Marxist front organizations have ever since engaged in a struggle to suppress scientific enquiry into the role of heredity in determining human abilities and human behavior, although recent research in both behavioral and pure genetics has unveiled the inconsistencies of "neo-Lysenkoism" and has provided irrefutable evidence concerning the overwhelming importance of heredity in shaping the individual human personality. Even now, however, misrepresentation in the media continues to hide from the general public, much of the essential knowledge concerning the role of genetics in shaping human intelligence and other personality traits. Leftist individuals and organizations engaged in this enterprise in the present decade are named.

Next follow two chapters reporting the results of the research conducted by Berkeley psychologist Arthur Jensen and the eugenic theories of the Noble Laureate William Shockley. Professor Shockley, the co-inventor of the transistor, was deeply concerned, like Alexander Graham Bell, Edward Teller and Sir Andrew Huxley, about dysgenic trends in contemporary Western society, and campaigned to bring this threat to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attention of the public. Both Shockley and Jensen had to face constant sniping from Leftists infiltrated into academe, violent demonstrations organized by Marxist students, and continuous harassment by the media. The object, it seems, was not merely to silence them, but more significantly to scare other faculty members – and even university administrators – from associating with them or from publicly acknowledging the importance of genetics in human affairs.

These chapters are augmented by a detailed account of the research, theories and subsequent persecution of the Guggenheim Fellow, J. Philippe Rushton, of the University of Western Ontario, and numerous other scholars such as Sir Cyril Burt, Edward O. Wilson, Richard J. Herrnstein, Michael Levin and Linda Gottfredson. Professor Rushton was exposed to the full wrath of the Left when he presented to the AAAS evidence ranking the major races by intelligence, sexuality and other characteristics. This led not only to violent Marxist-directed student demonstrations on his own campus, which intimidated the university administration, but also to a Canadian police investigation of his scholarly writings stemming from a complaint by Marxist organizations under the Canadian Race Relations Bill.

The author reveals the subtle techniques by which those who seek to investigate the role of heredity in shaping human personality and intellectual ability are persistently denigrated and intimidated, and the impact this has on other professors who fear being subjected to similar harassment. Numerous examples of the critical and unscholarly attacks by a small but vociferous and prolific core of "anti-racist" academics, such as Stephen J. Gould, Richard Lewontin, Leon Kamin, Jerry Hirsch and Barry Mehler, are documented.

Student demonstrators and the sniping of faculty Leftists would have had little impact, however, if it were not for the sympathetic treatment they have received in the media. This has been researched recently by Mark Snyderman and Stanley Rothman, who found ample evidence of media bias and of a pronounced tendency for the media to present Leftist extremists – even committed Marxists – as though their opinions were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

representative of academic consensus.

Race, Intelligence, and Bias in Academe concludes by analyzing the recent Twin Studies research at the University of Minnesota – as well as the revolutionary Human Genome Project which is engaged in identifying the loci responsible for determining genetic traits in individual humans. Recent discoveries now vindicate the work of scholars who have been pejoratively dubbed as "hereditarians" and "racists" by those who have made politicized egalitarianism into a veritable religion. Today it is widely accepted that heredity is 100% responsible for certain physical and physiological characteristics such as blood groups, hair and eye color etc., and is between 60% to 90% responsible for intelligence. Other personality factors, such as authoritarianism, aggressiveness, and risk-taking seem to be determined only about 50% to 60% by genetic heritage, and 40% to 50% by environment and life experience.

This volume is valuable not only for those who wish to understand why the importance of genetics in human heredity has been played down so long in the West, but also as a source book full of documented quotations from scholarly works and the press. It reveals the extent to which genetic factors do determine human abilities, behavior and personality, but also enlightens the reader as to the devious means by which Leftist faculty members, aided and abetted by elements within the media, have succeeded in keeping these facts away from both non-science university students and the general public.

THE INSECURE ALLIANCE: ENERGY CRISES AND WESTERN POLITICS SINCE 1944
By Ethan B. Kapstein
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990

The invasion of Kuwait by the armies of Saddam Hussein on August 2, 1990, caught the world by surprise. From a political perspective, it seemed to jeopardize President Bush's vision of a "New World Order." Changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa led many to believe that more nations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were embracing democracy and were prepared to use collective bodies like the United Nations to resolve their disputes. Iraq's bold stroke, however, opened a new chapter in the chronically turbulent history of the Middle East, and tested the collective resolve of the coalition assembled to restore Kuwaiti independence.

From an economic perspective, this first "post-Cold War" crisis risked compounding a world recession. It was hoped the boycott against Baghdad would bring Saddam Hussein to his knees. Securing sources of oil other than from Iraq and Kuwait was a major concern. The price of crude first rose in anticipation of shortages. The leaders of the industrialized world reacted quickly, however. By encouraging oil producing nations to step up production, by tapping strategic stockpiles of oil held in the West, and by ensuring that oil markets worked and prices reflected market value, the industrialized consumers of oil managed to arrest any major or sustained price rise and to restore public confidence in the health of Western economies.

Kapstein, who is affiliated with the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, presents case studies of energy crises using insights derived from hegemonic stability theory, bargaining theory and the literature of international organizations. For example, the United States took Britain's side in response to Iran's nationalizing British oil assets in 1951, but during the Suez crisis of 1956, France and Britain were summarily abandoned by the United States. Eisenhower did not see eye-to-eye with his European counterparts and believed their strategic interests were conflicting with his own agenda. Great pressure was exerted by the former to have Britain and France capitulate to Nasser and withdraw from the Suez canal zone.

Until the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 the United States had been regarded as the emergency supplier of oil of last resort. Spare production capacity made this possible. But by 1973, America's spare production capacity had vanished. Still smarting from the rejection over Suez, the Europeans decided subsequently to develop nuclear energy sources, but they were in no position to meet all of their energy emergency needs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without resorting to outside help.

Thus, when in 1973 the U.S. proved unable or unwilling to overcome the oil shortfall with its own resources, the experience proved quite unpleasant for the Europeans.

One of the shortfalls of the author's approach, it should be pointed out, is that it does not adequately explain why the hegemon, the dominant power (read: the United States) has used positive sanctions some times, and negative sanctions others; nor does the theoretical approach tell us much about the different ways in which alliance policy coordination may be achieved.

What makes Kapstein's analysis plausible, however, is that the Kuwaiti crisis was managed efficiently, coordination and cooperation was achieved, and we see reasonable prices at the gas pump. In this instance, the United States is the hegemonic power and can use its weight to coordinate alliance petroleum policy. And, because the allies share the same interests, they are managing to cooperate to ensure ready access to oil.

The resort to multilateral institutions for policy coordination was intended to reduce uncertainty during periods of crisis. In the energy field, the forum for debate and coordination has been the International Energy Agency (IEA), but during the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s the IEA failed to promote alliance cohesion. A small oil shortfall was translated into a huge panic as states rushed to the spot market or directly to the producers. The agency was a helpless bystander, its coordination attempts occurred too late in the day, and without sufficient authority to make a real difference.

Alliance coordination over energy matters remains a difficult task for the foreseeable future. As a consequence, governments are well advised to stockpile energy reserves, adopt market-oriented energy security strategies, undertake capital expenditures in fuel-efficient technologies, and produce economical automobile fleets. But we should also be aware of some of the ironies present in pursuing these free market goals. Western dependence on OPEC grows, and the allies have done little to counter the monopolistic practices of the cartel.

Graham McK. Kinahan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conservative Review

Multiculturalism & Free Society p. 32

Volume 2, Number 3

Teaching Feminism and Lesbianism in the Classroom
Leslie Carbone

The United Nations and the New World Order
Laura L. Kirmse

From Communism to Social Democracy
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.

Civil Rights or Group Privilege?
An Analysis of The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Eric Lindstrom

The End of History: Democracy of Chaos?
George Sunderland

The Other Government Ethics Problem
Andrew F. Quinlan & Farrell F. Quinlan

What Values Do Liberals Hold?
H. W. J. Edwards

Multiculturalism: Its Implications for a Free Society
Dwight D. Murphey

How Safe is Your Life Insurance?
Sam McClure

Prices: Individuals $28.00 – Institutions $56.00 p.a.

Council for Social and Economic Studies
6861 Elm Street, Suite 4H, McLean, Virginia 22101
Tel: 703-442-8010 Fax: 703-847-9524

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe

By Roger Pearson

Introduction: *Science and Racism*
By Hans J. Eysenck

Chapter 1: How it All Began
From Sir Francis Galton and Karl Pearson to the demise of the British and American Eugenics movements after World War II

Chapter 2: The Legacy of Marx, Mannheim and Lysenko
Marxian influence in the social sciences is traced with particular reference to anti-"hereditarian" bias and extreme environmentalism in the social sciences

Chapter 3: Scientific Luddites and Neo-Lysenkoists
A Harvard Medical School professor reveals the extent of Marxist activism in American academe and an ADL study identifies activist Marxist student organizations

Chapter 4: Arthur Jensen
The link between heredity and intelligence is summarized, and a comprehensive account is given of the persecution to which this Berkeley scholar was subjected

Chapter 5: William Shockley
A renowned Nobel Laureate, the co-inventor of the transistor, alerts America to dangers inherent in the widening gap between the intelligence of blacks and whites

Chapter 6: J. Philippe Rushton
A Canadian Guggenheim Fellow is persecuted by the media and by academic activists, and is investigated by the Canadian police, when he presents a paper to the AAAS which ranks races by intelligence, sexuality and other characteristics

Chapter 7: Activist Lysenkoism – The Case of Barry Mehler
Academic Leftists argue that genetic studies are pro-Capitalist. This is a case study of one such series of attacks on some of America's most responsible scholars

Chapter 8: Other Prominent Scholar-Victims
The experiences of other persecuted "hereditarian" scholars such as E.O. Wilson, Richard J. Herrnstein, Michael Levin and Linda Gottfredson are documented

Chapter 9: Academia, The Media and Public Policy
Scholars Snyderman and Rothman have demonstrated bias in the media treatment of scientific research into IQ, heredity and race. *Time* magazine is one of these

Chapter 10: Conclusion
"Hereditarian" thought is vindicated by the findings of the Minnesota Twin Research program and the Human Genome Project

Price $25.00 – 300 Pages – Paperback
ISBN 1-878465-02-3

Scott-Townsend Publishers
P.O. Box 34070, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20043

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED